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I. INTRODUCTION
What is the proper role of cost-benefit analysis in understanding
the tort concept of negligence or reasonable care? A straightforward
question, you might think. But it is a question that manages to elicit
groans of exasperation from those on both sides of the controversy.
For most utilitarians and adherents to law and economics, the
answer is obvious: to say that people should not be negligent is to
say that they should minimize the aggregate expected costs of their
activities-specifically, they should minimize the sum of the costs of
accidents and the costs of preventing accidents. In the famous
Learned Hand formulation, they should take a precaution if, but only
if, the marginal costs (or "burden," "B") of that precaution (in the
form of the tangible costs of the precaution or the lost benefits that
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taking the precaution would entail) are less than its marginal benefits
(in the form of reduced risks of injury, measured by multiplying the
probability ("P") of the injury times the magnitude ("L") of the
injury if it occurs). If B>PxL, it would be absurd to require the
greater expenditure, B.
For many advocates of a fairness, corrective justice, rights-
based, or contractualist perspective, the opposite answer is equally
obvious: if we permit a person to impose risks of harm on others
merely because he would thereby obtain a benefit (or would
otherwise incur a burden) greater than the discounted value of the
harm he might inflict, we are authorizing him to dump the costs of
his risky activities on innocent victims. To permit this type of
sacrifice of individuals on the altar of aggregate social welfare is
morally abhorrent.'
I will suggest that a more qualified position than either of these
polar views is more defensible and also more consistent with Anglo-
American tort doctrine. Before launching into my (perhaps equally
exasperating) argument for moderation, however, I offer five
examples and a question, in order to make the controversy more
concrete.
1. Is it better not to save a life so that billions
may view the World Cup live?
Consider an example offered by Professor Gregory Keating,
adapted from an example from philosopher T.M. Scanlon:
WORLD CuP BROADCAST
Suppose that a piece of transmitting equipment has toppled
and crushed a television technician helping to broadcast
[the World Cup live] to a billion viewers worldwide, and
that the only way to save the technician's life is to interrupt
the broadcast for thirty minutes, effectively thwarting the
transmission of the show ... '
1. "To refuse to mitigate the risk of one's activity is to treat the world as the dumping
ground for one's harmful effects, as if it were uninhabited by other agents." ERNEST J. WE1NRIB,
THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 152 (1995).
2. Gregory Keating, Pressing Precaution Beyond the Point of Cost-Justification, 56 VAND.
L. REV. 653, 666 (2003). Keating's actual example is the viewing of Baywatch, but as he points
out, nothing turns on the low (or high) value of the television show in the example; what matters
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A utilitarian approach of aggregating total benefits and burdens
would seem to require that the broadcast not be interrupted. After
all, even miniscule individual benefits add up to an enormous
quantity of social welfare when aggregated over a billion people.
But this result, that we should not interrupt the broadcast and save
the technician's life, appears to be morally abhorrent. As Keating
explains:
Although the number of viewers may be vast, the harm to
them is not morally comparable to the life of the technician.
Inconvenience and disappointment are not morally
comparable to death. No amount of inconvenience-
distributed across a large number of distinct persons-sums
to the loss of a single life.'
2. May a bus driver use less care when she is
transporting fewer passengers?
Here is another example that raises doubts about the moral and
legal relevance of aggregation-and specifically, about whether, as
cost-benefit analysis assumes, an aggregate increase or decrease in
the risk that one poses is always relevant to the permissibility of the
risk. Is it really justifiable (holding everything else constant) to
create a higher level of risk if the number of persons endangered is
smaller?
is that the show is very popular. The soccer World Cup seems to fit this criterion better than
Baywatch, which is a less likely candidate today for avid widespread viewing.
I will later discuss the original Scanlon example upon which this hypothetical is based;
some of the differences might be significant. See infra Part III.C.3.
3. Keating, supra note 2. As stated, the example involves a harm and a set of benefits that
are certain to occur. We could readily modify Keating's example, however, to pose the
analogous issue of whether it is permissible not to take a precaution against the future risk of such
a harm, notwithstanding the cost of losing the expected benefits. Thus, suppose the television
station is faced with a significant chance, but not with a certainty, that the technician will die
unless rescued. Or suppose the technician has not yet been crushed by equipment, but there is a
significant danger that the equipment will fall on him unless electricity is cut off. See Alastair
Norcross, Contractualism and Aggregation, 28 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 303, 310 (2002). I do not
believe that these factual differences would significantly alter the intuitive revulsion that most
observers would feel if the decision were made to continue the broadcast in the face of these
serious risks.
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LOUISE, DRIVING A FULL OR ALMOST EMPTY BUS
Suppose Louise is driving a bus on her usual route. On
Monday, the bus is full of passengers. On Tuesday, it has
only one. Is it permissible for her to drive faster on
Tuesday?
The view that due care depends on an aggregate cost-benefit
analysis, including the aggregate risks posed by one's conduct,
suggests that she may. If she loses control of the bus, the expected
harm to passengers is much greater on Monday than on Tuesday.
Everything else being equal,4 she should take more care to prevent a
risk of greater aggregate injury, and conversely she may take less
care to prevent a risk of lesser aggregate injury.
Yet, this is counterintuitive. Doesn't Louise owe each of the
passengers the same duty of care, the same consideration of his
interest in safety, without regard to how many other passengers are
on the bus?5
4. I am assuming that a greater number of passengers makes no appreciable difference to
her ability to control the bus.
5. This example is intended to express the same essential point as an example posed by
John Oberdiek:
If construction regulations were a function of consequentialist interpersonal
aggregation, it would follow that apartment high-rises would be built to make their
occupants safer than the occupants of single-family homes. Equally stringent
construction regulations would not be justified, on this view, for the simple fact that so
many more people would be at risk in the high-rise. This is a striking conclusion, and
one I believe is mistaken. Under contractualist intrapersonal aggregation, in contrast,
equally stringent regulations would in fact be justified. That any single person would
face the same probability and level of harm whether in an apartment building or in a
single family home would be dispositive. The sheer number of people at risk would be
irrelevant under intrapersonal aggregation-and that can never be the case when
employing interpersonal aggregation. Therefore, the theoretical basis of risk regulation
does matter. Whether to ensure the equal safety of all persons or to require different
levels of safety for different people is a stark choice, and one that risk regulators cannot
avoid. The respective options are in turn supported exclusively by rival moral theories.
And that makes the task of articulating the relevance of moral theory to risk regulation
quite literally a matter of life and death.
John Oberdiek, The Ethics in Risk Regulation: Towards a Contractualist Re-Orientation, 36
RUTGERS L.J. 199, 203-04 (2004); see also T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER
236 (1998). In a footnote, Oberdiek clarifies:
I am not suggesting that the more specific building codes should be identical for high-
rises and single-family homes. Different building codes may be justified by a single
regulatory standard of care. Surely, high-rises need to be built from stronger materials
than single-family homes, and in this way conform to stricter building codes, in order
to ensure occupants of the former the same level of safety as occupants of the latter.
Oberdiek, supra, at 204 n. 14.
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3. Is it permissible to impose greater risks on the poor?
In a commendable display of candor, Judge Richard Posner
identifies a possible difficulty with his wealth maximization account
of tort law, which, roughly speaking, is a particular version of the
utilitarian approach:6
DRIVING FASTER IN A POOR NEIGHBORHOOD
Wealth maximization "[implies] that a person should feel
free to drive faster in a poor than in a wealthy neighborhood
because expected accident costs are on average lower in the
former . . . ." After all, "the magnitude of the loss if an
accident occurs [is] a function in part of the income of the
victim[], making the optimal expenditure of time and other
resources on avoiding accidents in the poor neighborhood
also lower."8
These three examples support the intuition that aggregating costs
and benefits of risky conduct is a morally objectionable way to
determine when that conduct is permissible. Now consider two
examples suggesting the contrary, that such aggregation is morally
acceptable or even morally required.
4. Is high-speed driving unjustifiable because it sacrifices
lives for mere convenience?
Philosopher Alastair Norcross offers the following example:
HIGH-SPEED DRIVING (LIVES FOR CONVENIENCE)
The current speed limits on high-speed roads of 55 miles
per hour ("mph") (or more) predictably result in a large
number of accidental deaths that could be avoided if we
significantly lowered the speed limits. Yet the justification
of the higher speed limits seems to be a widespread but
6. I say "roughly speaking" because wealth-maximization shares with a utilitarian account
a requirement of aggregation and an insensitivity to the distribution of risk, harm, and benefit.
However, as defended by its leading exponent, this account treats wealth as a narrower concept
than social welfare. See Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Tort Law: A Philosophical
Inquiry, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 99 (David G. Owen ed., 1995).
7. Id. at 110.
8. Id.
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slight social benefit: the simple convenience of reaching
one's destination more quickly.
However, as Norcross points out, "We are not morally obligated
to impose a national speed limit of 50 mph (or less)."9
Most people would agree, and do not believe that automobile
drivers should drive extremely slowly (or not at all), even though we
can predict with statistical certainty that slowing down will greatly
reduce the number of accidental deaths, and even if the only benefit
that drivers obtain from their greater speed is simple convenience."
Yet, the intuitive plausibility of the principle that lives may be traded
off for mere convenience when we are establishing highway speed
limits seems to suggest that consequentialist aggregation is more
generally permissible, a position that is much harder to defend.
Indeed, Norcross further argues that if the "High-Speed Driving
(Lives for Convenience)" principle is correct, then we are committed
to other positions that are intuitively much less plausible, such as:
LIFE FOR HEADACHES
"There is some finite number of headaches, such that it is
permissible to kill an innocent person to avoid them.""
Readers familiar with a recent article by Cass Sunstein and
Adrian Vermeule in defense of the death penalty 2 will notice a
similar argumentative strategy. The authors point to recent studies
9. Alastair Norcross, Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives, 26 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 135, 160 (1997) [hereinafter Norcross, Comparing Harms]; Alastair Norcross, Speed Limits,
Human Lives, and Convenience: A Reply to Ridge, 27 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 59 (1998). Norcross's
actual example is "highway" driving, but I have changed it to "high-speed" driving in order to
emphasize that a substantial number of the victims of such driving do not benefit from it in any
realistic sense. On a divided highway, as opposed to a high-speed road that passes through
residential areas, it is much more likely that virtually all of the victims are drivers or passengers
who in some sense benefit from the activity of speedy driving.
10. Norcross, Comparing Harms, supra note 9, at 159.
11. Id. Precisely how an intentional killing would prevent innumerable headaches is not
specified. Perhaps the victim's heart contains a rare type of cell that is the only possible headache
cure? Or perhaps the victim's life-saving supply of antibiotics, if taken from him and
redistributed, would save a billion people from headaches. See Alastair Norcross, Great Harms
from Small Benefits Grow: How Death Can Be Outweighed by Headaches, 58 ANALYSIS 152,
152 (1998).
12. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REv. 703 (2005).
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suggesting that imposing the death penalty for murder has a
substantial deterrent effect. If these studies are valid, they argue,
then the government is morally obliged to impose the death penalty,
just as the government is morally obliged to take affirmative
precautions through regulation and others means (including tort law)
to assure the safety and health of its citizens. 3 Norcross, Sunstein
and Vermeule are willing to bite the bullet and accept the more
controversial conclusion (the state has a duty to kill an innocent to
prevent many headaches, and a duty to execute murderers), based on
their belief in the inexorable logic of consequentialism. Are they
correct? Or, if they are wrong, and if "High-speed driving (lives for
convenience)" is morally distinguishable from this parade of
horribles (including the "World Cup" example), how do we draw and
defend the distinction?
5. Is it unjustifiable to sell a product that is convenient
and useful but unusually dangerous?
SUB-SUBCOMPACT AUTOMOBILE
Suppose an automobile manufacturer sells an extremely
small automobile for its convenience to urban drivers
interested in parking in very small spaces. (Examples
include the Smart Fortwo, recently introduced in the United
States; 4 and the extremely basic Tata Nano, 5 recently
introduced in India.) Although part of the car's attraction is
its low price, another significant benefit is its tiny size. At
the same time, that size also makes the passengers
significantly more susceptible to physical harm in the event
13. See id. at 721-22 (arguing that for ordinary torts, the act-omission distinction is
meaningless, since whatever government does or fails to do, the act or omission will support the
entitlement of one or the other party in the dispute).
14. See Alistair Weaver, First Drive: 2008 Smart Fortwo, EDMONDS INSIDE LINE, Feb. 21,
2007, http://vww.edmunds.com/insideline/do/Drives/First Drives/articleld=l 19682. The car,
produced by DaimlerAG, is only 106 inches long.
15. See Sharon Silke Carty, Tiny Tata Has All of Detroit Talking, USA TODAY, Jan. 16,
2008, http://www.usatoday.com/money/autos/2008-01-15-nanoN.htm (last visited Nov. 10,
2008). The Tata Nano, produced by Tata Motors, will retail for about $2,500 (but is sixteen
inches longer than the Smart Fortwo). It is designed as a safer replacement for mopeds. "In the
developed world, we kind of miss the point," says Rick Wagoner, the CEO of General Motors.
Id. "We think, 'How would that car do in a crash test?' But we miss the point that it's better than
being in a crash in a two-wheeler." Id.
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of a collision with another automobile or with a roadside
hazard.
Is it unjustifiable to sell an automobile with a design that some
consumers find attractive because of its convenience and usefulness,
even though the design is unusually dangerous? Although the
benefits to consumers are relatively modest, and spread relatively
widely, the "costs" in the form of serious injury and death will be
very severe and suffered by only very few. Nevertheless, the activity
of selling such a product intuitively seems perfectly acceptable.
Finally, the clash of moral intuitions revealed by the earlier
examples is on vivid display when we confront the following
question:
6. Is it wrongful for a potential injurer to explicitly consider the
costs and benefits of taking a precaution?
Consider the following result of research conducted by Professor
Kip Viscusi:
CORPORATE RISK ANALYSIS AS A RECKLESS ACT
When mock jurors are confronted with hypothetical
examples of companies that conduct explicit cost-benefit
studies to decide whether to adopt a precaution, they are
much more likely to impose punitive damages if the
company has conducted such a study, even when its
decision is cost-justified and is therefore (arguably) non-
negligent, than if the company has not conducted such a
study, even when its decision is not cost-justified, i.e., is
negligent.16
Similarly, Gary Schwartz, in his article examining the famous
(or infamous) Ford Pinto litigation, noted that defense lawyers shy
away from the argument that a cost-benefit analysis justifies a
company's decision not to take a safety precaution, for they
recognize that the argument can expose their client not only to
16. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 547,
588 (2000) (reporting results of mock juror analysis showing that "undertaking any type of risk
analysis was harmful to the corporation's prospects both with respect to the probability of
punitive damages and, more importantly, with respect to the magnitude of the award").
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compensatory but also to punitive damages. 17 The lesson that many
people take from the Pinto case itself is that the very act of engaging
in cost-benefit analysis displays morally reprehensible callousness."
But if the previous two examples are correct in suggesting that
aggregate benefits to many (even in the form of mere convenience)
can justify aggregate costs to a few (even in the form of serious
injury or death), then what is wrong with an individual or corporation
explicitly invoking this type of justification? If lay jurors find the
justification morally abhorrent, who is right?
This Article is organized as follows. After reviewing the scope
and assumptions of the argument, and the underlying philosophical
perspectives, I examine and reject two types of unqualified views
(simple forms of consequentialist balancing and also deontological
views that reject all tradeoffs between values). I then endorse two
families of qualified views, one consequentialist, the other
deontological. The conclusion suggests that the Learned Hand test is
sufficiently flexible to accommodate both sets of qualified views and
addresses the question how we might choose between a qualified
consequentialist and a qualified deontological account.
II. SOME CLARIFICATIONS
A. Scope and Assumptions
This Article focuses on the proper analysis of the moral and
legal concept of negligence. Strict liability is considered only
peripherally.
Although this Article pays some attention to the descriptive
question of how the law actually defines negligence, the emphasis is
on how negligence should be understood, and on underlying
justifications and principles. Only brief attention is given to
institutional questions (such as the role of judge and jury in
articulating negligence), questions that are of course quite important
for the law to resolve.
17. Gary Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 1038
(1991).
18. See id. at 1035-37, 1043-45 (collecting numerous sources supporting this proposition);
see also FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING THE PRICE OF
EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (expressing moral objections to cost-benefit
analysis as it is usually conducted).
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The paper concentrates on injurer rather than victim negligence,
on advertent rather than inadvertent negligence, and on misfeasance
cases.
I view negligence to be a species of fault, of deficient conduct,
of conduct that should have been otherwise. 9  Furthermore,
negligence liability is, I believe, best understood as expressing a
primary duty not to act negligently. Negligence liability is not
merely a pricing mechanism. In Robert Cooter's terminology, it is a
sanction, not a price. I will, however, discuss consequentialist
views that do not presuppose these understandings of negligence.
In this Article, I say little about consent and assumption of risk.
These are important issues in tort law, but they are not the focus here
because they do not play a necessary role in justifying risk in our
legal system, nor is it plausible that they could do so. To be sure,
Kantians sometimes emphasize the impermissibility of harming
others unless they consent; one could similarly argue that risking
harm to others is always impermissible unless they have consented to
the risk. But the argument is too broad to be plausible: innumerable
risky activities are tolerated in the contemporary world even though
it is unrealistic to claim or expect that all those exposed to the risk
(including bystanders and even children) subjectively "consent" in
any meaningful sense of the term. As we will see, however, we
should (and realistically can) ask a broader, but structurally similar
question: whether those exposed to a risk sufficiently benefit from
the risky activity.2'
19. See Kenneth W. Simons, Negligence, 16 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 52, 54-57 (1999)
20. Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1524, 1538-40 (1984).
21. This is not to say that subjective consent or assumption of risk is irrelevant to
permissibility. To the contrary, I think a pluralistic account of tort law is plausible, one that
considers consent, autonomy, special relationships, social roles, reliance, expectations, and a
number of other values in determining the existence and scope of a legal duty and the
permissibility of a risk. See Kenneth W. Simons, Deontology, Negligence, Tort, and Crime, 76
B.U. L. REV. 273, 284 (1996) [hereinafter Simons, Deontology]; Kenneth W. Simons,
Justification in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 698, 737 (1996) (reviewing. WEINRIB, supra
note 1) [hereinafter Simons, Justification]. For other pluralist accounts of tort law, see Bruce
Chapman, Pluralism in Tort and Accident Law: Toward a Reasonable Accommodation, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 276 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Izhak Englard, The
Idea of Complementarity as a Philosophical Basis for Pluralism in Tort Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 6; Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg & Zipursky s
Civil Recourse Theory, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1557 (2006). See also JOHN KEKES, THE
MORALITY OF PLURALISM (1993) (defending a pluralist view of moral values).
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What is "risk"? This is an important and complicated topic,
carefully explored by Matthew Adler 2 and Stephen Perry,23 among
others. For the purposes of this essay, I will simply assume an
epistemic conception, characterized essentially as the risks that a
reasonable person would deem sufficiently important to be relevant
to whether to take a precaution. I do not believe that any of the
arguments in this essay turn on the question of how risk is properly
characterized for purposes of understanding negligence. (I will,
however, address the significance of the distinction between
individual and population risk.)
Finally, this essay examines how negligence should be
understood in light of underlying normative justifications for tort
law, not in light of how tort law performs the functions of deterrence,
compensation, and loss-spreading.24
This essay is largely normative, though I believe it also offers a
plausible description of much of tort practice. It is part of a larger
project in which I suggest that a nuanced version of the Learned
Hand test is both morally attractive and a credible interpretation of
22. See Matthew Adler, Against "Individual Risk": A Sympathetic Critique of Risk
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005); Matthew Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The
Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REV. 1293 (2003).
23. See Stephen Perry, Risk, Harm, Interests, and Rights, in RISK: PHILOSOPHICAL
PERSPECTIVES 190 (Tim Lewens ed., 2007).
24. "Deterrence," "compensation" and "loss-spreading" are often described as justifications
of tort law. However, the better view is that they are simply functions, effects or constitutive
parts of tort law. The question of justification runs deeper. See Kenneth W. Simons, The
Crime/Tort Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719
(2008). With respect to compensation, why must the injurer compensate the victim? Because the
victim has a right to recovery, as a matter of corrective justice? Or because he has a right to
recourse? See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents of the Great Society, 64
MD. L. REV. 364, 402-03 (2005); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice,
91 GEO. L.J. 695, 746 (2003). If deterrence of risky behavior occurs as a result of tort liability,
does this serve at least as a partial justification of tort liability? If so, this could be because we
wish to deter inefficient behavior (a utilitarian approach), because we wish to deter rights-
violations (a broader consequentialist approach), or because we endorse a mixed approach
encompassing both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist values in which one goal is the
minimization of rights-violations. See Gary Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming
Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801, 1831 (1997). And, if we applaud
the loss-spreading function of tort law, we might do so because the function operates as an
efficient form of insurance, or instead because of a fairness-based principle, that those who
benefit from an activity, service, act, or product, should in fairness pay for at least some of the
predictable injury costs that the activity inflicts on participants, users or bystanders. See Stephen
Sugarman, Doing Away with Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 555, 613-16 (1985).
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tort practice. 5 To be sure, there is much controversy about the
descriptive claim that the Hand test reflects Anglo-American tort
law. Jury instructions (except in some products liability cases) rarely
refer to Hand balancing, 26 and appellate decisions refer to such
balancing only intermittently.27 Rather, "reasonable care under the
circumstances" appears to be the (remarkably vague and opaque)
"standard" that many jurisdictions require juries to apply in
determining negligence.28 In the conclusion, I endorse a more
systematic, disciplined analysis of negligence than this standard
provides.
B. Philosophical Framework:
Consequentialism v. Nonconsequentialism;
Individual Moral Duty v. Global Perspective
The broad underlying normative principles that will receive
discussion in this essay are consequentialism (especially
utilitarianism) and nonconsequentialism (especially such
deontological principles as corrective justice, "fairness," and
contractualism). But we also must attend to two distinct ways of
understanding the point of a legal duty not to be negligent (and the
associated duty to pay damages if one is negligent). Is the point to
express or reinforce an individual moral duty not to be negligent? Or
is the point to express or implement a more global consequentialist
(or nonconsequentialist) vision, of which the individual duty is just
one part?
The debate between consequentialism and deontology restates,
at a more fundamental philosophical level, the two competing modes
of exasperation noted in the introduction at a more fundamental
philosophical level. For consequentialists, more welfare is better
25. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901 (2001) [hereinafter
Simons, Hand Formula]; Simons, supra note 19; Simons, Deontology, supra note 21.
26. See Patrick J. Kelley & Laurel A. Wendt, What Judges Tell Juries About Negligence: A
Review of Pattern Jury Instructions, 77 CHI-KENT L. REV. 587, 619 (2002); Michael Wells,
Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The Revenge of the Ordinary Observer, 26 GA.
L. REV. 725, 735 (1992); Benjamin Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999,
2013-17 (2007).
27. See Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the
Reasonable Person Standard, and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 843 (2001).
28. See sources cited in supra note 26; see also Ken Abraham, The Trouble with Negligence,
54 VAND. L. REV. 1187 (2001) (underscoring the vagueness problem with negligence standards).
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than less.29  Who in their right mind would want less? For
deontologists, some actions are intrinsically wrong, or a violation of
rights, even if they would secure more welfare. Who would
seriously reject this common sense perspective?3"
Utilitarianism (in its familiar law and economics version) is the
form of consequentialism that is most frequently invoked as a
rationale for the institution, and the particular doctrines, of tort law.
But a consequentialist (or specifically utilitarian) analysis can
interpret tort liability for negligence in two distinct ways.
First, it could view the legal duty not to be negligent, and to pay
damages for negligence, as expressing or reinforcing an individual
moral duty not to create unjustifiable risks. And it would spell out
the moral duty in purely consequentialist terms: an actor has created
an unjustifiable risk just in case the ex ante costs of taking a
precaution against creating the risk are less than the ex ante benefits
of the precaution, with costs and benefits defined in a purely
consequentialist (or specifically utilitarian) way.
Second, a consequentialist might instead specify the scope of the
legal duty not to be negligent by reference not merely to the risks
that it would be justified or unjustified for an individual to take, but
also to the other, second-order costs and benefits of employing the
individual-focused legal rule. This global approach might sometimes
still require a legal liability rule of negligence, but it also might
require strict liability, or no liability, or varying versions of the
standard negligence criterion, depending on the context.3' The
29. See Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS I (Samuel Scheffier ed.,
1988) ("[A]I1 [consequentialists] share...a very simple and seductive idea: namely, that so far as
morality is concerned, what people ought to do is to minimize evil and maximize good, to try, in
other words, to make the world as good a place as possible."); see also LOUIS KAPLAN & STEVEN
M. SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21-23, 62-81 (2002) (arguing that "fairness"
principles should not be applied as independent evaluative criteria for social decision-making, but
can play a subsidiary role in welfare-based criteria, insofar as people often have a "taste" for
fairness and insofar as notions of fairness sometimes are good proxies for social norms that
promote social welfare).
30. See Introduction to CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS, supra note 29, at 2.
31. Here are two examples of a disjunction between the individual and global approaches.
First, suppose that the individually optimal conduct is to: "Drive five mph over the speed
limit except when a slower speed would obviously be required because of unusually heavy traffic
conditions." But further suppose that the following simpler rule is much easier to monitor and
enforce: "Drive no faster than the speed limit, and always be found non-negligent if you do so."
Then this rule (requiring greater care than what individual optimality would require) is now
globally optimal in light of all costs and benefits.
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optimal global approach will also depend on the costs and benefits of
each type of tort liability rule (taking into account error, institutional,
and other costs), and on the cost-effectiveness of alternative legal
approaches (including criminal law and regulation).32
Why does this distinction matter? Because these two different
consequentialist approaches require very different types of analysis.
A person who fails properly to weigh the expected utilitarian costs
and benefits of his actions is arguably subject to blame for not
properly considering the effects of his actions on others. Here we
see the Kantian strand within utilitarianism. This strand is a coherent
understanding of negligence, even if a social judgment of blame or a
legal sanction such as a liability rule will have little or no effect on
future conduct (of that person or others).
The global approach is quite different. Here, a primary reason
for the legal rule of liability for negligence is to induce optimal care.
At the same time, the global approach has to consider the costs and
benefits of using tort law (or other legal or social sanctions) to
stimulate potential injurers to act carefully. Thus, although the
"optimal" care that the global approach actually recommends might
turn out to be the same standard of care that the individual duty
approach would require, it might also be some other level of care that
is socially optimal in light of other costs and benefits of trying to
induce a suitable level of care and in light of other effects on social
welfare.
In the Anglo-American common law tradition, when courts
judge whether there is sufficient evidence of an actor's negligence,
sometimes they emphasize the need to balance the advantage and
disadvantage of taking a precaution. In so doing, they often
But conversely, the global approach sometimes requires less care than the individual
norm does. Suppose that a rule of legal liability in a particular context would be so likely to
discourage desirable activity that it is better not to impose liability even on types of conduct that
are suboptimal. For example, assume, as some utilitarians say, that it is optimal for an individual
to perform a rescue if the burden of rescuing is less than the expected benefits to the potential
victim. Yet a legal rule of liability for not rescuing might discourage some people from visiting
locations (for example, the beach or ski slopes) where others might need rescue. See RICHARD
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 191 (7th ed. 2007). (This empirical claim seems
doubtful to me, but let us assume that it is established.) Accordingly, a very limited legal duty of
easy rescue might ultimately be optimal in light of these further negative incentives, even if what
utilitarianism really demands is a duty to rescue whenever the direct expected benefits of rescuing
exceed the direct costs.
32. See Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 274-75. For a similar contrast, see LIAM
MURPHY & THOMAS NAGEL, THE MYTH OF OWNERSHIP: TAXES AND JUSTICE 23 (2002).
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articulate the first type of consequentialist calculus, which
determines whether the actor breached an individual moral duty to
use reasonable care. But they are not necessarily endorsing a more
global consequentialist judgment that legal liability in such a case is
socially optimal. That is, we only occasionally see courts explicitly
mention the deterrent effects of negligence rules. I conjecture that
courts sympathetic to a consequentialist understanding of individual
tort duties would continue to apply an individual, consequentialist
calculus even if they were certain that the application of this criterion
of negligence would not have any significant effect on whether
actors in the future use reasonable care.33
Within nonconsequentialist views, such as deontological views,
again it is valuable to distinguish between an individual moral duty
not to create unreasonable or unjustifiable risks, and a more global
perspective. Sometimes the law imposes liability on a person not
merely to express or reinforce the wrongfulness of his breaching an
individual moral duty to use reasonable care, but also (or instead) to
embody or promote other nonconsequentialist values, such as
corrective justice, retributive justice, distributive justice, or respect
for rights.3  (Thus, one straightforward nonconsequentialist
justification for punitive damages is to add a retributive sanction to
especially blameworthy conduct.) And sometimes the law declines
to impose liability for a breach of individual moral duty when
liability would conflict with other nonconsequentialist principles.
(For example, some nonconsequentialists believe that the moral
principle of beneficence requires rescue, but that the law should not
enforce that duty because enforcement would seriously infringe a
political value, autonomy to pursue one's own ends.)
33. See Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 278. For example, a global consequentialist
approach might support imposing tort or even criminal liability on those who do not lock their
cars, while imposing no or very light tort and criminal law sanctions on car thieves, if this would
better prevent theft and resulting injuries). Cf Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and
Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 340 (1984)
(pointing out that raising the penalty for unauthorized use of a car or imposing criminal liability
on owners who leave their car unlocked may prove equally effective in reducing the number of
car thefts). Here, the individual moral duty is quite complicated to articulate: must the individual
calculate who else can take care, and how burdensome that would be? It might, however, be
globally optimal to impose liability here, without regard to the feasibility of specifying the
individual duty.
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 (1965).
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One context that highlights the difference between these
perspectives is the (supposed) problem of overprecaution. On its
face, utilitarianism offers a dubious analysis of the problem of
overprecaution, for the theory suggests that it is morally wrong to
take a greater precaution if a lesser precaution would be
economically optimal. "Under the utilitarian-efficiency theory, it is
as inefficient to be above the optimal level of care as to be below it:
either form of divergence therefore should be considered
negligent."35 To be sure, the global consequentialist approach to tort
liability normally need not create a special incentive rule to address
this problem. Normally, the injurer will absorb the costs of excess
precaution, and ordinarily, this will provide him with sufficient
incentive not to overinvest in safety.36 Still, the consequentialist
account of individual moral duty remains problematic.
A nonconsequentialist account of tort duties will address the
problem of overprecaution differently from the utilitarian account
and, I believe, more persuasively. The nonconsequentialist will not
see overprecaution as a general problem. If a generously inclined
potential injurer decides to minimize the risks to others more than is
required by the individual moral duty not to be negligent (whether
that duty is understood in utilitarian or nonutilitarian terms), arguably
she deserves praise for her beneficence, not moral criticism. For
example, if someone decides to drive extremely slowly (without
thereby hindering any other drivers) in order to minimize risks to
others, she hardly deserves moral blame.37
35. Richard Wright, The Standards of Care in Negligence Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW, supra note 6; see also Ronen Perry, Re-Torts, 59 ALA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2008), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1021547. Indeed, in an early article,
Richard Posner suggested that aversion to waste or to the squandering of resources was the moral
defect underlying the efficiency account of tort law. Richard Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 29, 33-35 (1972).
36. See Perry, supra note 35, at 11; see also Ariel Porat, Offsetting Risks, 106 MICH. L. REV.
243, 246 (2007) (arguing, on incentive grounds, that tortfeasors should only be liable for the net
risks created by their wrongdoing, after offsetting the risks that their conduct reduced from the
risks that their conduct increased).
37. The utilitarian might reply: her slow driving demonstrates either (1) that she places very
little value on getting to her destination quickly, or (2) that she obtains private psychic benefits
from being considerate to others. Accordingly, her driving slowly is what the utilitarian calculus
recommends, after all.
The first reply is one, but not the only, possible explanation: perhaps she cares as much as
most other drivers do about getting to her destination quickly, but she cares about the welfare of
others even more than most people do. The second reply is inadequate and often disingenuous.
First, it is a contentious question whether the most defensible conception of utilitarianism in the
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Of course, the general question of when an individual moral
duty should be enforced by a legal duty or sanction (and whether it
should be enforced through tort liability, regulation, or criminal
liability) is complex. I cannot say much about the issue here.38 But it
is important to see that how we understand negligence, on either a
consequentialist or nonconsequentialist account, greatly depends on
whether we focus largely on the individual duty to exercise
reasonable care, or instead on the place of that duty within a larger
institutional structure designed either to promote good consequences
more generally or to embody nonconsequentialist values such as
rights, corrective justice, and distributive justice.
III. REJECTION OF UNQUALIFIED VIEWS
In this section, I suggest that two approaches to understanding
negligence are both highly implausible: (1) unqualified
consequentialist cost-benefit balancing and (2) an unqualified
deontological rejection of all tradeoffs between values. First,
however, I briefly examine and dispose of a seductive
consequentialist argument to the effect that nonconsequentialism
cannot explain why risky conduct is impermissible.
A. A Preliminary Point: "Risk" Analysis
Need Not be Consequentialist
Some commentators claim that the moral and legal analysis of
negligence must turn on consequentialist, not nonconsequentialist,
principles, because negligence by definition involves taking an
unjustified risk, that is, a risk that a future bad consequence (such as
physical harm to person or property) might occur.39 The claim is
context of tort liability standards would encompass psychic benefits of this sort within "utility."
Second, this type of reply is too convenient, for it is available in any case where the
nonconsequentialist analysis differs from the utilitarian analysis. Take any case in which the
utilitarian approach would suggest that a precaution should not be taken, notice that the actual
actor did take the precaution, then explain his doing so by attributing to him a private taste or
preference (that taking the precaution will satisfy) sufficiently weighty to move the needle on the
"Do I take a precaution?" balance from no to yes. Unless one has independent grounds for
believing that people only act for reasons of utility, this method of reconstructing reasons for
action is question-begging.
38. For helpful recent discussions in the context of tort law, see John C.P. Goldberg &
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on
Legal Duties, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1563, 1585-88 (2006).
39. See, e.g., Heidi Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 262 (1996).
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mistaken. To be sure, we do need to examine the immediate
potential consequences of the injurer's actions to determine whether,
ex ante, the risk was permissible or justifiable. But the ultimate
rationale for either moral or legal sanction of such risky conduct
could depend on either consequentialist or nonconsequentialist
considerations.40
One way to see the fallacy in this argument is by examining the
analogous issue that arises with the privilege of self-defense and with
other justification defenses, such as necessity. Whether an actor can
permissibly act in self-defense depends on "risks" in just the same
sense that risk is relevant in negligence doctrine. In self-defense, the
relevant risks include the probability that the assailant will cause
serious injury or death if not resisted, the probability that the actor's
defensive force will cause serious injury or death, and the probability
that the actor's use of a lesser degree of force would be equally
effective. One might plausibly assert, for example, that if the
unlawful assailant is posing at least a nontrivial risk of killing the
actor, then the actor is entitled to use defensive force even if he
believes it is highly probable that the only force at his disposal will
kill the assailant. And yet it is perfectly clear that one can provide
intelligible nonconsequentialist as well as consequentialist accounts
of the right to use self-defense.41
A related but similarly unpersuasive argument proceeds from the
controversial assumption that all deontological requirements are
categorical prohibitions. On that assumption, and because risks are
pervasive and are sometimes justifiable and sometimes not,
deontological principles cannot explain when it is permissible to
impose risks. Many deontologists, however, reject the assumption:
they endorse noncategorical principles, including threshold
deontology. 42 Again, even standard doctrines of self-defense (which
40. See Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 298-99; Simons, Hand Formula, supra note
25, at 908-16; see also Stephen Perry, Responsibility for Outcomes, Risk, and the Law of Torts, in
PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 21, at 72, 80 (stating that "a theory of
corrective justice and tort law is not, merely by virtue of focusing on outcomes rather than on
actions as such, necessarily consequentialist in nature").
41. See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 206-09 (3d ed. 2006)
(identifying four theories underlying defenses of justification, such as self-defense, two of
which--"moral forfeiture" and "moral rights"-are nonconsequentialist).
42. See, e.g., Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in THE STANFORD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 4 (2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontologicaU
(distinguishing the varieties of threshold deontology).
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deontologists routinely endorse) contain probabilistic and
noncategorical elements. 3
B. Reject Simple Cost-Benefit
Consequentialist Views
This section briefly identifies problems with wealth-
maximization as a normative ideal, with simple preference-
satisfaction versions of utilitarianism, and with even idealized
versions of utilitarianism if they place no constraints on aggregation.
1. Reject wealth-maximization
as a normative ideal
Posner's introductory example of speeding in a poor
neighborhood is a telling objection to a wealth-maximization model.
Just because the poor have lower wealth and income and thus will
receive less compensation for injury when compensation is based in
significant part on lost income, it hardly follows that they value their
health and safety less than the affluent. Indeed, Posner himself has
backed away from the normative claim that he originally made for
his wealth-maximization position, the claim that wealth itself is a
social value that ought to be maximized." Moreover, federal
agencies, in the analogous context of government regulation, use an
invariant figure for the monetized value of a statistical life, and do
not modify the figure based on a prediction of the wealth of the
expected victim.45
A wealth-maximization account is also problematic insofar as it
offers an illusion of precision, implausibly suggesting a rigorous,
mathematical formula for determining the justifiability of risks. One
imagines a corporate accountant methodically inputting the various
probabilities of harm and benefit into a spreadsheet; if the costs are
$1,000,001 and the benefits are $1,000,000, then he will instruct the
43. Perry, supra note 40, at 79 (arguing that "Hurd embraces too narrow a conception of
non-consequentialism" insofar as she insists that non-consequentialist prohibitions must be
categorical); see also Simons, Deontology, supra note 21, at 290-92.
44. Ronald Dworkin's powerful retort to Posner's wealth-maximization approach ultimately
convinced Posner that a wealth-maximization approach can only be justified on pragmatic
grounds, not as an independent, normatively attractive approach. See Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth
a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 192 (1980); Posner, supra note 6, at 101.
45. MATrHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEw FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS 130 (2006). The authors clarify that "[agencies] use a range, but they do not make
their choice within the range depend on the wealth of the victim." Id. at 217 n.17.
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engineers or product designers not to add the safety feature. But as
Learned Hand himself acknowledged long ago, this type of precision
is illusory.46 At the same time, the pretense that a straightforward
equation can accommodate all the necessary values for determining
the permissibility of risk-creation might itself contribute to the
popular misconception that any form of explicit analysis of tradeoffs
is cold-bloodedly inhuman.
2. Reject any simple preference-
satisfaction version of utilitarianism
Some advocates of economic analysis of law simply take it for
granted that social welfare must be understood as the aggregate sum
of "utility" defined as the satisfaction of human preferences. But this
is only one possible understanding of utility, and a controversial
one.
47
Consider this example, from the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
[1]n certain negligence cases there may be burdens of risk
prevention that courts properly discount or decline to
acknowledge. For example, certain motorists-though
hoping for and expecting a favorable outcome-may find it
exciting to race a railroad train towards a highway crossing.
Yet because society many not recognize that excitement as
appropriate, it may be ignored by the jury in considering
whether the motorist should have driven more
conservatively.
48
The point that private preferences do not automatically count as
elements of social utility is an important one. Preferences must be
46. Moisan v. Loftus, 178 F.2d 148, 149 (2d Cir. 1949).
47. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 45, at 28-30; Jules Coleman, The Grounds of Welfare,
112 YALE L. J. 1511, 1524-25 (2003) (noting that the analysis in Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN
SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), sometimes treats the superiority of "welfare"
over "fairness" in this essentially tautological way: values of "fairness" matter to the rightness of
an action or the justice of an institution only insofar as people have a taste or preference for
fairness).
Coleman also points out the crucial ambiguity in the idea that preference-satisfaction is
valuable: this could be a logical claim, that welfare consists of the satisfaction of preferences; or
instead a psychological claim, that satisfying preferences typically brings psychological or some
other type of hedonic benefit to the person holding the preference. Coleman, supra, at 1541-43.
48. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 cmt. 4, at 44
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005). The example is taken from Gregory Keating, Reasonableness
and Rationality in Negligence Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 311, 369 (1996).
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"laundered" and "idealized" if they are to be a defensible element of
a social utility function that is implemented as a legal norm.49
3. Reject even idealized versions of utilitarianism
if they place no constraints on aggregation
The modifications suggested thus far do not go far enough,
however. The idealized version of utilitarianism still permits trivial
benefits for a very large number of persons to outweigh enormous
costs (such as death or serious personal injury) to a few. It still
permits the television station in the introductory World Cup example
not to save the endangered worker if the aggregate benefits to
television viewers are great enough. (Consequentialists do have
some ways to address this problem, as we will see below.)
To be sure, an apparently egalitarian norm is contained within
all utilitarian views: each person's utility counts equally. But that
norm does not answer the objection to unrestricted aggregation. A
comment by Stephen Perry is instructive here. The Draft
Restatement (Third) of Torts offers this explanation of what it claims
to be a corrective justice rationale for tort liability:
The defendant who permits conduct to impose on others a
risk of harm that exceeds the burden the defendant would
bear in avoiding that risk is evidently a party who ranks
personal interests or welfare ahead of the interests or
welfare of others. This conduct violates the ethical norm of
equal consideration, and a tort award seeks to remedy this
violation."
Perry points out that this argument expresses
the problematic idea that treating interests equally amounts
to treating persons equally. After all, if you impose a cost-
justified risk on someone else, you get to keep the benefits
of the action while the other person incurs the costs. That
49. This is especially true if preference-satisfaction is treated as relevant to a
consequentialist calculus that purports to justify an individual moral duty of reasonable care. On
the other hand, insofar as the legal negligence rule is designed to be part of a global
consequentialist calculus, all of the actor's private preferences might bear on how great a sanction
is needed to deter him.
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: GEN. PRINCIPLES § 4 cmt. j (Discussion Draft 1999).
The most recent draft employs very similar language. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:
LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 6 cmt. d (Proposed Final Draft No. 1 2005).
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does not look very much like the application of a norm of
equal consideration."
C. Reject Deontological Views That Reject
All Tradeoffs Between Values
Just as we should reject unqualified consequentialist views, we
should reject unqualified deontological views that forbid any
tradeoffs between values. Any plausible analysis of the justifiability
of risky conduct must consider both the advantages and the
disadvantages of taking a precaution. This feature of risk analysis
does not commit one to a purely consequentialist account of
negligence.
Consider some straightforward examples where tradeoffs must
be permitted. Suppose that taking a precaution would avoid a risk to
group A but then would increase the risk even more to group B, and
suppose that neither group has a greater moral claim on D. Then the
risk to B would be a decisive reason not to take the precaution. As
the Restatement (Third) of Torts explains:
In certain situations, if the actor takes steps to reduce one
set of injury risks, this would involve the burden or
disadvantage of creating a different set of injury risks, and
these other risks are included within the burden of
precautions. For example, if the motorist takes the
precaution of surveying the area next to the highway in
order to identify livestock or animals that might be
approaching the highway from adjacent property, the
motorist is less able to detect hazards emerging on the
highway itself. 2
Deontologists differ about how conflicts of duties or rights should be
resolved, but the simple fact that a conflict exists and that the duties
and rights must be reconciled hardly commits one to a
consequentialist form of accommodation.53
51. Stephen Perry, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Negligence Standard, 54 VAND. L. REV.
893, 896 (2001) (emphasis omitted).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL HARM § 3 cmt. e (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1 2005).
53. For a recent effort by a leading deontologists to explicate a nonconsequentialist method
of accommodation, see FRANCES KAMM, INTRICATE ETHICS: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND
PERMISSIBLE HARM 285-301 (2007).
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Similarly, any plausible account must also engage in marginal
analysis: it must consider whether moral or legal norms require a
specific, discrete precaution (e.g., installing a safety guard on a piece
of machinery), or whether they require a particular level of a
continuous precaution (e.g., at what speed it is reasonably safe to
drive, or how high to build a protective fence). To be sure, marginal
analysis is systematically employed, and heartily endorsed, by
economic and utilitarian theorists. This association might suggest
that nonconsequentialists should therefore be very skeptical of
marginal analysis. But the conclusion does not follow. Surely a
deontologist will, and should, have more difficulty justifying a
requirement that the owner of a cricket field place a dome over the
field to prevent balls from escaping the field and injuring nearby
pedestrians, than a requirement that he build a fence around the
field. 4
In the remainder of this section, I review some "anti-balancing"
arguments that have been offered by critics of consequentialism,
arguments that I believe are too unqualified: that we should consider
only the risks, benefits and burdens that the risky conduct creates to
the actual injurer and the actual victim; that imposing any
foreseeable risk is impermissible; or that any interpersonal
aggregation of benefits or burdens is impermissible.
1. Do not restrict analysis of negligence to the risks, benefits and
burdens that the risky conduct creates
to the actual injurer and the actual victim
One superficially plausible nonconsequentialist account of
negligence, especially tempting to some corrective justice scholars,
begins with the fact that the individual defendant has harmed an
individual plaintiff, and then concludes that the question whether the
defendant breached a duty to that plaintiff must be analyzed only in
terms of the risks, benefits, and burdens to those two parties.5
54. See Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). Of course,
the way in which deontologists conduct marginal analysis will differ from the way in which
utilitarians conduct that analysis. If, for example, the governing deontological principle is that
substantial risks can only be imposed on those who sufficiently benefit from the risk, and if the
benefit that pedestrians obtain from the presence of a neighborhood cricket field is relatively
slight, then a deontologist might conclude that only a very high fence satisfies the duty of due
care, while a lower (and less expensive) fence might satisfy a utilitarian.
55. See Perry, supra note 35, at 44-45; see also WEINRIB, supra note 1, at 142-44.
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This account is unrealistic and indefensible. Limiting our
evaluation of the permissibility of risky conduct to the risks posed to
the person who was actually injured gives undue and unnecessary
weight to luck, and fails to take seriously the ex ante perspective that
we should adopt in assessing whether an actor has breached a duty of
care.
Focusing only on the ex ante risk to the person who was actually
injured leads to highly implausible results. Consider a simple
example. If I bring a group of people out on the lake on my boat, I
have a duty not to overload the boat with too many passengers. The
fact that only Jane drowned because of my breach of that duty hardly
shows that the scope of my duty, or the question whether I breached
it, depends only on the risks of injury that my actions posed to Jane.
My giving Jane alone a ride on the boat would have created no
serious risk of injury or death from overloading. I must consider the
risks of harm (and the necessary precautions) in light of everyone I
put at risk because of my failure to take a precaution.
2. Reject the broad, categorical principle
that imposing any foreseeable risk is impermissible
One prominent deontological account of negligence supports a
truncated version of the Learned Hand test that, in essence, ignores
"B," the burden of taking a precaution. Different versions of this
account have been offered by Richard Wright,56 Ronen Perry,57
Stephen Perry (in earlier writing),58 and Ernest Weinrib.5 I will limit
my discussion here to the views of Wright and Ronen Perry.
In Wright's words:
[G]iven the Kantian requirement of treating others as ends
rather than merely as means, it is impermissible to use
someone as a mere means to your ends by exposing him (or
56. Wright, supra note 35, at 256.
57. See e.g., Perry, supra note 35, at 42-43.
58. See Stephen Perry, The Impossibility of General Strict Liability, 1 CAN. J. L. & JURIS.
147, 169-71 (1988). Perry has since rejected this view. Perry, supra note 51, at, 897.
59. See WEINRIB, supra note I, at 148-52. For discussion, see Kenneth Simons,
Justifications in Private Law, 81 CORNELL L. REV. at 711-12 (1996).
David McCarthy, in a series of articles, has argued for a moral duty to compensate for
imposing risks of harms on others, an argument recently defended in Tony Handfield & Trevor
Pisciotta, Is the Risk-Liability Theory Compatible with Negligence Law?, 11 LEGAL THEORY 387
(2005). See David McCarthy, Liability and Risk, 25 PRIL. & PUB. AFF. 238, 259 (1996); David
McCarthy, Rights, Explanation, and Risks, 107 ETHICS 205, 205-06 (1997).
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his resources) to significant foreseeable unaccepted risks,
regardless of how greatly the benefit to you might outweigh
the risk to him.60
Wright goes on to propose different standards of care for eight
different situations, according to such factors as whether the injurer
or victim benefits or whether the defendant is engaged in a socially
essential activity. 6 This is an imaginative rethinking of the tort
negligence standard, and aspects of it are normatively appealing, as
we will see. Specifically, his emphasis on the critical importance of
the distribution of risks and benefits is persuasive. I do not believe,
however, that his multiple standards accurately reflect tort doctrine,
and the actual scheme that he recommends for implementing a
concern with distribution is problematic.
Consider, for example, Wright's discussion of his first two
categories. The first category, "defendants' treating others as
means," involves cases in which a defendant puts the plaintiff at risk
to benefit the defendant or some third party, and the plaintiff does
not seek to benefit directly from the risk-creating activity. Here, he
claims, the actual test of negligence is whether defendant created "a
significant, foreseeable, and unaccepted risk to the person or
property of others. 62  Only minimal legal authority, however, is
offered for this descriptive claim.
Wright's second category, "defendants engaged in socially
essential activities," is exemplified by a fire engine speeding to the
scene of a fire in a populated area.63 Here, one would think that it
should be permissible to impose very substantial risks on others to
secure the public benefit of saving lives immediately threatened by
60. Wright, supra note 35, at 256. In more recent writing, Wright has modified his views in
certain respects. For example, he has clarified that he endorses a truncated BPL test (in which B
is ignored) only when the defendant engages in risky conduct for private benefit. Richard Wright,
Negligence in the Courts: Introduction and Commentary, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 425, 436-37
(2002). He furthermore agrees that "socially valuable activities" such as emergency vehicles can
justifiably impose risks on others, though he still insists that those risks must be less than
"substantial," an insistence I do not share. Richard Wright, Hand, Posner, and the Myth of the
"Hand Formula, " 4 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 145, 205 (2003).
61. His (non-exhaustive) categories are: (1) defendants' treating others as means, (2)
defendants engaged in socially essential activities, (3) defendant occupiers' on-premises risks, (4)
defendants' activities involving participatory plaintiffs, (5) paternalistic defendants, (6) plaintiffs'
self-interested conduct, (7) plaintiffs' self-sacrificing conduct, and (8) defendants' failure to aid
or rescue. Wright, supra note 35, at 261-74.
62. Id. at 261.
63. Id. at 264.
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fire. But Wright claims that even emergency vehicles may not
impose significant risks of injury on others.' This is dubious. Even
when driven as carefully as the circumstances permit, consistent with
very quickly reaching the scene of the fire, fire engines undoubtedly
impose much greater risks than if they were driven more slowly.
Police engaged in a high-speed chase of an armed, dangerous
suspect, even when they use the extra care appropriate to the
situation (which, alas, they often do not), undoubtedly impose
significant risks on passersby. I believe that it is unrealistic and
unpersuasive to assert that in all of these cases, the defendants act
impermissibly if they impose any "significant" risk on others. As
explained further below, the fact that the population as a whole
shares the potential benefit of rescue from fire, or of security against
the risk of harm from an escaping armed criminal, should permit
rescue vehicles to impose relatively substantial risks to the public
when these are necessary in order to achieve that benefit.
But what about Wright's first category, as he circumscribes it?
Is "Do not impose any significant (and unaccepted) risk" a defensible
criterion, at least in those cases where the injurer unilaterally
imposes risks on a group of victims who do not benefit from the
activity? I will return to this question below.
Let me turn to another version of Wright's first criterion,
defended in a forthcoming article by Professor Ronen Perry. Perry
advocates what he characterizes as a Kantian conception of
negligence, under which an actor is liable for creating any "real,"
foreseeable risk of injury.65 Two features of Perry's argument are
especially noteworthy. First, he concludes that the burden of taking
a precaution should be irrelevant to negligence liability.66 Second, he
asserts that whether the actor has impermissibly created a "real" risk
of injury to another is determined solely by examining "the
interaction between the two parties to the action, and not on the
effects of that interaction on society at large."67
64. In emergencies, he says, the defendant can exceed normal speed limits and other traffic
controls "only if she undertakes additional precautions or warnings (such as slowing down at
intersections, sounding sirens, and flashing lights) so that those thereby put at risk can, without
significant interference with their legitimate activities, avoid being exposed to a substantial or
significant risk." Id. at 265.
65. Perry, supra note 35, at 39.
66. Id. at 51.
67. Id. at 45.
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The first feature, by itself, would result in an extraordinarily
broad liability rule, given that many common activities, such as
driving an automobile, practicing medicine, or producing or using
consumer products, create pervasive and nontrivial risks." Nor is it
clear how one would distinguish risks below the threshold from risks
above it, especially in light of the difficulty of identifying the proper
frame of reference for assessing the degree of the risk.69
The second feature does significantly limit the scope of the first,
by insisting that we ignore the possible effects of a person's conduct
on persons other than the actual victim of the harm. But this
limitation is itself very difficult to justify. As explained above,
limiting our evaluation of the permissibility of risky conduct to the
risks posed to the person who was actually injured gives undue and
unnecessary weight to luck and insufficient consideration to the ex
ante perspective that we should take in assessing whether an actor
has breached a duty of care. Moreover, one of Perry's reasons for
imposing the second limitation is misplaced. Perry expresses
concern that the duty of the actor should not depend on the effects of
his interaction with the victim on society at large. He is worried, in
short, that a broader conception of the actor's duty, extending beyond
risks to the actual victim, will improperly turn on broad
consequentialist considerations. But on a plausible understanding of
the extent of a tortfeasor's duty of care, that duty extends to all who
might foreseeably be harmed by failure to take a precaution. This
interpretation of the duty need not be consequentialist. Rather, it
simply reflects the ex ante perspective under which duty is defined.
68. See Robert Rabin, Law for Law's Sake, 105 YALE L.J. 2261, 2274-76 (1996) (reviewing
ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW (1995)) (criticizing Weinrib's similarly broad
formulation of negligence); Simons, Justification, supra note 21, at 702-07 (criticizing Weinrib
for the same reason).
69. According to Ronen Perry, one is negligent for posing real risks but not farfetched ones.
"A farfetched risk is the kind of risk that every person is prepared to endure, knowing that all
human activity involves such risks and that trying to eliminate them would disable action.
Conversely, no one is willing to be exposed to real risks." Perry, supra note 35, at 39. This is a
valiant effort, but I fear that the distinction, so characterized, has little content.
For helpful discussion of these characterization problems, especially in the context of an
objectivist view of risk, see Perry, supra note 23. To be sure, the "threshold" problem potentially
exists under the Learned Hand test as well, insofar as the test is sometimes interpreted as
requiring the actor to incur a burden of precaution only if the risks are "foreseeable." The
problem, however, is less troubling here, if the requirement can be understood more flexibly,
taking into account both the degree of foreseeability and the nature and extent of the burden.
Perhaps even very small risks should be avoided if the burden of avoidance is extremely small
and even foreseeable or significant risks need not be avoided if the burden is quite significant.
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To be sure, the class of persons foreseeably endangered by risky
conduct cannot be precisely determined in advance,7 ° but it can be
meaningfully described and delimited. And, as we have seen, the
valid conceptual point that a "risk of harm" presupposes some degree
of probability (less than one) of a future consequence (the harm)
does not imply that all normative theories of risk are consequentialist
theories in the morally significant sense of that term.
The rights-based claim that actors should be liable for all
foreseeable risks might be understood differently, however, as a
claim of strict liability, not negligence. On this view, it is not
necessarily wrongful or impermissible to engage in conduct, such as
careful driving, that creates foreseeable risks of harm, but the driver
should still pay for the harm caused by the (reasonable) risks he
imposes on others.' Whether nonconsequentialist principles can
support this liability rule is beyond the scope of this essay. But it is
important to recognize that a very different normative justification is
required to rationalize strict liability than to rationalize negligence
liability for impermissible risk-imposition.72
3. Do not forbid all interpersonal aggregation of benefits or burdens
The philosopher T.M. Scanlon has formulated a distinctive
deontological principle, contractualism, which he believes is
especially powerful in countering the attractions (and remedying the
defects) of utilitarian accounts of interpersonal duties. The
introductory "World Cup" example is Keating's variation on a
famous example by Scanlon intended to show the moral deficiency
of unrestricted utilitarian aggregation.
Scanlon's approach concentrates on the burdens that a moral
principle would impose on all affected individuals, considered one
70. "Foresecability" is itself an imprecise concept, but it can be given more determinate
meaning in light of the principles of corrective justice, fairness, or consequentialist aggregation
that justify its use. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 23.
71. See Simons, Justification, supra note 21, at 705.
72. Negligence, in my view, connotes deficient behavior, while strict liability does not. In
principle, we would enjoin negligent conduct if we could. Moreover, punitive damages would
never be appropriate in strict liability cases. Cf Simons, Hand Formula, supra note 25, at 905-
06 (discussing the moral difference between strict liability and negligence); Kenneth W. Simons,
Jules Coleman and Corrective Justice in Tort Law: A Critique and Reformulation, 15 HARV. J. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 849 (1992).
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by one. 73  He plausibly asserts that his highly individual-focused
approach explains the objection to a principle permitting unrestricted
aggregation "in an intuitively appealing way.''74  But he avoids this
(Scylla) principle at the apparent cost of colliding with an equally
objectionable (Charybdis) principle prohibiting any aggregation
whatsoever. Thus, he has great difficulty explaining why a rescuer,
faced with the choice of rescuing either five people from Island A
who would otherwise die or one person from Island B, may
permissibly save the five (rather than flip a coin or use some other
method of choice).75 Scanlon would have even greater difficulty
explaining why it is permissible for a rescuer to save a group of
people, each of whom will otherwise suffer the same type and degree
of harm, rather than a single person, who will otherwise suffer a
slightly greater harm than each of the group. Suppose, for example,
that the five people on A will each suffer the loss of a limb if not
rescued, while the one person on B will otherwise suffer both the
loss of a limb and a mild headache.76 These difficulties are
73. SCANLON, supra note 5, at 229-31 (discussing the "Complaint Model"). Scanlon
explains that "a central feature of contractualism [is] its insistence that the justifiability of a moral
principle depends only on various individuals' reasons for objecting to that principle and
alternatives to it." Id. at 229. See generally Elizabeth Ashford & Tim Mulgan, Contractualism,
in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY § 6,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2007/entries/contractualisrn/. For a valuable overview of the
contractualist method, including the requirement that the governing moral principle be one that no
affected individual could "reasonably reject," see Rahul Kumar, Reasonable Reasons in
Contractualist MoralArgument, 114 ETHICS 6 (2003).
74. SCANLON, supra note 5, at 230:
A contractualist theory, in which all objections to a principle must be raised by
individuals, blocks such [aggregative] principles in an intuitively appealing way. It
allows the intuitively compelling complaints of those who are severely burdened to be
heard, while, on the other side, the sum of the smaller benefits to others has no
justificatory weight, since there is no individual who enjoys these benefits and would
have to forgo them if the policy were disallowed.
75. In essence, Scanlon employs the following "pair-wise comparison" or tie-breaker
argument: the claim to rescue of the one on B offsets the equal claim of one person on A. Once
these claims are put aside, the only remaining claims are those of the remaining four on A, and
there is no good reason not to rescue them. This argument has been criticized, however, as
permitting a limited form of aggregation after all. See, e.g., Michael Otsuka, Scanlon and the
Claims of the Many Versus the One, 60 ANALYSIS 288 (2000). Frances Kamm offers an
argument similar to the "tie-breaker" argument for why the numbers can count. KAMM, supra
note 53, at 56-61,479-81.
76. See Ashford & Mulgan, supra note 73, § 6. The following example is suggested by
Derek Parfit's discussion of contractualism and aggregation:
Consider a choice between two scenarios. In the first, one person suffers agony for a
hundred years; while in the second a million people suffer agony for a hundred years
minus a day. An additional day of agony is a considerable burden. Therefore if we
Summer 2008] NEGLIGENCE COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS 1201
problematic enough for harms and benefits that are certain to occur;
they are especially troublesome in the context of risks of harm. For
our activities typically create multiple sets of risks and benefits to
different classes of people, and if we can never aggregate across
people, it seems that we can never justify such risky conduct.
Addressing the issue of the permissible allocation of risk, though
only briefly, Scanlon notes one appealing feature of his approach: it
does not permit the low probability that one will be exposed to an
otherwise unjustifiable risk to be determinative in situations where
this is intuitively objectionable.77 But he also concedes that his
contractualist approach, by condemning all aggregation, appears to
have highly counterintuitive implications, including the implication
that high-speed driving, construction projects, and other activities
that predictably will lead to serious injuries and deaths are
unacceptable if their justification depends on much smaller benefits
to a larger number of people.78 The numbers do sometimes count
consider the situation from the perspective of the single individuals involved, it would
seem that the first person's complaint ('I will suffer for a hundred years') outweighs
the complaint of any other single individual ('I will suffer for a hundred years minus a
day'). However, a utilitarian would argue that, in this case, the second scenario is
worse.
Derek Parfit, Justifiability to Each Person, 16 RATIO 368-70 (2003).
77. See SCANLON, supra note 5, at 208-09:
Consider [a] principle licensing us to impose very severe hardships on a tiny minority
of people, chosen at random (by making them involuntary subjects of painful and
dangerous medical experiments, for example), in order to benefit a much larger
majority. A contractualist would want to keep open the possibility that such a principle
could reasonably be rejected because of the severe burdens it involves. But this would
be effectively ruled out [if one endorses an alternative proposal, that improbability of
harm is relevant to justifiability], according to which the weight given to these burdens
... would be sharply discounted because only a very small fraction of the population
would actually suffer them.
78. See id. at 238; T.M. Scanlon, Replies, 28 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 337, 355 (2002); see
also Elizabeth Ashford, The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism, 113 ETHICS 273, 298-
301 (2003) (arguing that Scanlon's nonaggregation requirement would have dramatic
implications, such as forbidding air travel). Scanlon concedes that he views the part of his book,
THOMAS SCANLON, WHAT WE OwE EACH OTHER (1998), devoted to the question of aggregation
the "least satisfactory." Scanlon, supra, at 354.
Gregory Keating, a tort scholar otherwise sympathetic to Scanlon's critique of
aggregation, believes that sometimes, trading risks to life for convenience is permissible.
Keating, supra note 2, at 702; Gregory C. Keating, Pricelessness and Life: An Essayfor Guido
Calabresi, 64 MD. L. REV. 159, 195-201 (2005). Implicitly, he rejects Scanlon's pair-wise
comparison approach as inadequate.
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morally. 9  The great difficulty, on a contractualist account, is to
explain when they do, and why.
Nevertheless, there is some hope, as we will see, that a limited
type of aggregation might be consistent with at least important
aspects of the contractualist project.
IV. ENDORSEMENT OF QUALIFIED VIEWS
More qualified consequentialist and deontological views offer
more plausible accounts of important aspects of negligence doctrine
and of our considered intuitions about permissible risks.
A. Qualified ("Sensitive") Consequentialism
We have already seen that any plausible version of utilitarianism
must launder and idealize preferences to some extent, and thus will
sometimes reject subjective valuations of benefits if they are
inconsistent with a defensible conception of social utility. (Recall
the example of the driver who obtains pleasure from racing a train.)
And once utilitarianism is qualified in this way, it has a number of
possible variants. For example, utility itself could be understood not
as preference-satisfaction, but as constituted by certain limited
categories of objective social goods such as Amartya Sen's
"capabilities," or the objective lists of goods offered by Martha
Nussbaum or James Griffin (including such varied goods as life,
bodily health, accomplishment, autonomy, enjoyment, and deep
personal relations)."
Let us turn, then, to forms of qualified consequentialism that
offer some hope of addressing the concerns raised by the initial
examples.
79. John Taurek's famous article has spawned a large body of nonconsequentialist literature
trying to justify the consideration of relative numbers in choice situations. John Taurek, Should
the Numbers Count?, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 316 (1997). For a recent review of some of the
relevant literature, see Iwao Hirose, Review Article: Aggregation and Non-Utilitarian Moral
Theories, 4 J. MORAL PHIL. 273 (2007).
80. See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 45, at 31-32. For a useful survey of some of these
possibilities, see id. at 28-35. Adler and Posner reject a purely objective view and endorse a
"restricted preference-based view" of welfare, in which subjective preference is a necessary but
not sufficient condition for a state of affairs to enhance the subject's welfare. Id. at 36.
The approaches of tort scholars Mark Geistfeld and Gregory Keating seem to be based at
least in part on an "objective good" conception of well-being. See generally Mark Geistfeld,
Negligence, Compensation, and the Coherence of Tort Law, 91 GEO. L. J. 585 (2003) (claiming
that tort law prioritizes the security interest of victims over the liberty and economic interests of
injurers); Keating, supra note 48 (asserting a similar claim).
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1. Consider the distribution of risk in the social welfare
calculus of what is permissible
The most obvious way for a consequentialist to respond to the
objection that one may not permissibly impose enormous risks of
harm on a few to benefit a different group is to build this concern
about unjust distribution into the social welfare calculus. Of course,
a distribution-sensitive social welfare function is hardly a new idea.s"
However, the distributive problem we confront here is rather
different from the usual concern that the ex post distribution of
wealth and income that flows from a utilitarian social and economic
system might lead to or accentuate the maldistribution of basic
resources (or, in the Rawlsian phrase, of "primary goods" 2). The
usual prescription to use tax and transfer policies to correct the
maldistribution after the fact will hardly do when we are addressing
individual decisions whether to engage in a risky activity. Moreover,
it is important to remember that the question we are addressing is
what risks it is permissible to create, and not merely what to do about
allocating the costs of risky activities that cause harm. In the World
Cup example, the television studio certainly should compensate for
the harm if it chooses to continue the broadcast. But it would have
been much better if it had chosen otherwise; and indeed, the case is
one in which punitive damages seem perfectly appropriate.
So the question remains: in determining when it is permissible
for an actor to impose a risk of harm on others, is it feasible to
develop a consequentialist calculus that also considers the
distribution of risk and benefits (perhaps as a side-constraint on the
basic maximizing, aggregative analysis)?
This does seem theoretically feasible. For example, the legal
standard could endorse utilitarian maximization subject to the
constraint that most or all members of the class subject to the risk
must also obtain some benefit, or sufficient benefit, from the risky
activity. It is no easy matter, however, to explain what type and
degree of reciprocity or fairness in distributing benefits and burdens
is required here (as we will see in the more extensive discussion
81. See, e.g., Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 28-38
(2002) (explaining how the framework of welfare economics can encompass concerns about the
distribution of income).
82. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 57-61 (2001).
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below). Needless to say, this criterion cannot readily be expressed
by any simple formula, such as the Learned Hand test.
Moreover, even this distribution-sensitive approach does not
fully address the concern in Keating and Scanlon's examples that
trivial benefits could, if aggregated across enough people, outweigh
very substantial harms or risks of harm, and thus could, on a
consequentialist account, justify imposing that risk. Even when the
distribution of benefits and burdens does not seem unfair, this
concern remains. Consider this variation of World Cup:
WORLD CUP BROADCAST WITH RANDOM (VIEWER) VICTIM
Suppose that a piece of transmitting equipment has
malfunctioned and, unless fixed, will interrupt for thirty
minutes the live broadcast of the World Cup to a billion
viewers worldwide. Unfortunately, the only way to fix the
equipment immediately is to send a corrective electronic
signal that (we can confidently predict) will also randomly
cause one of the television sets tuned in to the broadcast to
explode, likely killing one viewer.
Here, every potential victim is also a beneficiary of the
broadcast, but it hardly seems permissible to sacrifice one life in
order to provide a billion people with a small benefit. It is not clear
that a consequentialist can solve this problem.83
2. Consider the distribution of risk in determining
whether to compensate
This essay focuses on how negligence should be analyzed.
However, it is worth considering the argument that an unjust or
impermissible distribution of risk should not matter at all to whether
conduct is negligent, but instead should only be relevant to the
question whether the injurer should pay for the harm. This argument
is a specific version of an argument often asserted by advocates of
law and economics, that utilitarianism or efficiency should be the
normative basis of legal rules, and that the legal system should
address any problems of inequity or unjust distribution through the
83. However, she could endorse a mixed theory that includes a deontological constraint-for
example, the constraint that benefits below some threshold of significance will be excluded from
the social welfare function. See text at infra note 102.
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tax and transfer system. Why is this strict liability principle not an
adequate response to unfair distribution of the risk of harm?
One answer is that compensation for some types of harms is
impossible. No amount of money will fully compensate a dead
person. In Keating's World Cup example, the death of the technician
cannot be undone. No amount of compensation from the television
studio, or from the billion people who enjoy the live broadcast, will
suffice. 4
But full compensation for other types of harms seems to be
feasible. This is especially obvious for harms to property and
economic interests. Some amount of compensation will almost
always be sufficient to make the victim indifferent, after the fact,
between receiving the compensation for the harm or not having
suffered the harm at all.
Or consider Scanlon's original hypothetical, which differs
significantly from Keating's version. In the original, if the
technician is not rescued, he will suffer no permanent injury, but
merely an hour of extremely painful shocks:
SCANLON'S ORIGINAL WORLD CUP BROADCAST CASE:
Suppose that Jones has suffered an accident in the
transmitter room of a television station. Electrical
equipment has fallen on his arm, and we cannot rescue him
without turning off the transmitter for fifteen minutes. A
World Cup match is in progress, watched by many people,
and it will not be over for an hour. Jones's injury will not
84. Indeed, Mark Geistfeld has argued that precisely because full compensation is infeasible
for serious physical injuries and death, an unusually demanding negligence standard (rather than a
cost-benefit negligence standard or a strict liability standard) is necessary in such cases in order to
provide adequate deterrence and to provide potential victims with a justifiable substitute for full
compensation. The more demanding negligence standard is a legitimate substitute, he argues,
because it provides such victims ex ante benefits: they are exposed to less risk than a cost-benefit
negligence test would permit. See Geistfeld, supra note 80, at 602-08. This argument is
intriguing, but the cure does not seem to match the diagnosis. After all, strict liability rules apply
even when serious personal injury or death occurs. Insofar as compensation is inadequate to
achieve optimal deterrence, we could address the problem more consistently and directly, for
example by adding an extracompensatory award to damages (in serious physical injury cases), a
part of which the state receives. Finally, the ex ante benefits that potential victims obtain from
the requirement that the injurer use extraordinary care will help only a small number of victims
(those who would have been injured if the injurer had used ordinary care but are not injured when
he uses extraordinary care), and these benefits are conferred more or less randomly. It is not clear
why saving this small and arbitrarily defined group from harm is an apt response to the problem
of undercompensation.
1205
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LA W REVIEW [Vol. 41:1171
get any worse if we wait, but his hand has been mashed and
he is receiving extremely painful shocks. Should we rescue
him now or wait until the match is over? Does the right
thing to do depend on how many people are watching-
whether it is one million or five million or a hundred
million?85
Suppose Jones would be indifferent after the fact between some
generous form of compensation and not having suffered this injury.
Is everyone not better off if we permit the injury to occur?
This argument seems to prove too much. For it would also seem
to permit risky activities that we would normally consider
impermissible even apart from distributive considerations.
Negligence would, then, always be acceptable behavior so long as
the negligent actor was willing to pay the full price.
Scanlon and other moral philosophers who have emphasized the
problematic nature of aggregative principles such as utilitarianism
have focused almost exclusively on permissibility--on whether an
actor may permissibly impose (or choose not to prevent) serious risks
of harm on a small number of persons simply because a very large
number of persons will obtain small benefits. And a primary moral
duty not to impose such risks would ordinarily justify a secondary
moral (and, arguably, legal) duty to compensate if the risk results in
harm. But does the imposition of the risk actually become
permissible if full compensation, where feasible, is awarded?
I do not think so. Some kinds of risk-imposition are wrongful,
whether or not the victim can be fully compensated. Suppose a
wealthy thrill-seeker happily pays for the property damage that his
dangerous driving causes, and suppose his compensation payments
leave his victims indifferent between (a) suffering harm and being
compensated or (b) not suffering harm. He is still a wrongdoer, and
still should not cause the harm. This is so even if somehow he could
be certain in advance that the only harms he will cause are ones that
can be fully compensated. The problem is not simply the practical
concern about future incentives-that a policy of allowing such a
person to treat tort liability as a price of permissible activity rather
than as a sanction for impermissible activity will often encourage
85. SCANLON, supra note 5, at 235.
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him or others to engage in wrongdoing that leaves many victims
undercompensated.86 Rather, the problem is deeper: in principle, an
actor should not treat victims in this way, even if they would, ex
post, be satisfied with compensation. We would certainly not be
comfortable granting someone a license to steal, to assault, or to
humiliate another, even if he was willing to pay the costs, and even if
all the immediate victims would be satisfied ex post that they had
been fully compensated.
To be sure, impermissible risky activity does not rise to that
level of wrongdoing. But sometimes it is still sufficiently wrongful
that ex post compensation does not vitiate the wrong. To put this
argument in utilitarian terms, all citizens suffer noncompensable
harm or disutility from living in a system in which the right to
engage in impermissible conduct can be bought for a price. From a
deontological perspective, potential victims have a status of
inviolability that such a practice would undermine."
Where does this leave the argument that an act that unjustly
distributes risks and benefits can always be addressed by
compensation, rather than by treating the underlying conduct as
negligent and impermissible? Sometimes, at least, distributive
injustice makes an otherwise permissible act negligent.88 This seems
to be the case in both World Cup examples.
On the other hand, perhaps when the only harms at stake are
harms to property and economic interests, a distributive inequality of
the sort illustrated in the World Cup examples would not be
objectionable. Suppose, for example, that the World Cup scenario is
modified in this way: the television equipment will cause $1 million
in damage to an adjoining property unless it is shut off, but again, if
it is shut off, a billion people would lose the pleasure of watching the
86. Often, there is no guarantee that a risky activity will create no substantial risk of serious
injury or death, which are the types of injures for which full compensation is most obviously
impossible. And even if the activity risks causing only emotional harm or harm to property
interests, these, too, cannot always feasibly be fully compensated. Even here, the legal system
cannot compensate effectively either for all consequential economic harms or for emotional
harms that are difficult to measure reliably, due to problems of subjective valuation and fraud.
87. See KAMM, supra note 53, at 26-30, 253-56.
88. Other forms of distributive fairness might aptly be secured by strict liability rather than
negligence liability. Consider the vicarious liability of retailers for product defects that are
initially created by manufacturers. This type of strict liability arguably serves a loss-spreading
function in order to achieve a localized form of distributive justice: it is more fair that the
blameless retailer rather than the consumer absorb the risk of the manufacturer's insolvency.
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World Cup live. Is it not permissible to continue the broadcast, so
long as the property damage is fully compensated?
B. Qualified ("Tough-minded") Deontology
In this section, I explore three broad categories of qualified
deontological principles that, by comparison to more unqualified
principles, more readily permit tradeoffs and limited forms of
aggregation. The first category focuses on the individual put at risk
and asks whether he sufficiently benefits from the risky activity. It
permits aggregation of risks and benefits, but only intrapersonally.
The second category is threshold deontology: it permits
consequences to count, but only in a constrained or limited way.
Each category has considerable promise in addressing the problems
and conundrums noted at the outset. A third distinction, between
individual and population risk, initially appears promising, but its
practical significance for negligence law is uncertain.
1. Permit intrapersonal but not interpersonal
aggregation of risks and benefits
Nonconsequentialists, including even contractualists, might be
able to support intrapersonal aggregation of risks and benefits,
without sliding all the way down that slippery slope to unrestricted
interpersonal aggregation.89 When those who benefit are entirely
coextensive with those put at risk, many nonconsequentialists would
have no objection to permitting the risky activity (so long as the
benefit is sufficiently valuable to justify the risk). Straightforward
examples include individual decisions to undergo surgery, or to take
a drug with known possible side-effects, despite the risks.9" Another
89. This method is endorsed by some contractualists in recent writings. See, e.g., SCANLON,
supra note 5, at 237; .Oberdiek, supra note 5; John Oberdiek, The Morality of Risking: On The
Normative Foundations of Risk Regulation (2003) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Pennsylvania) (on file with author).
90. Or consider an example offered by Benjamin Zipursky:
In some scenarios . . . it would arguably comply with a norm of being reasonably
careful to adopt a single metric and to adopt an aggregative analysis. For example, in
Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. Zapata Corp., then-Judge Breyer used
an economic version of the Hand Formula in a banking case. The question was
whether a bank used ordinary care to ascertain customers' check forgeries. The bank
argued that its policy of random checking was reasonable, and it showed that the policy
was far cheaper and only marginally less effective than-or perhaps as effective as-a
system that looked at every check. Affirming a District Court judge, and using the
Hand Formula and cost-benefit analysis, Judge Breyer agreed with the bank. The
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example is "Sub-subcompact automobile," from the introduction. A
manufacturer may permissibly sell a product that poses unavoidable
risks of harm to consumers or users if they obtain significant benefits
from the product. This approach retains contractualism's focus on
the individual, and characterizes a risk as permissible only if each
individual exposed to a risk of harm can be said to benefit
sufficiently from the conduct or activity that creates the risk.
The intrapersonal aggregation approach also helps to make sense
of the introductory Bus Driver example. Louise, it seems, should not
take more or less care in driving her bus simply because she is
carrying more or fewer passengers. But one possible explanation is
that each of the passengers (however many there are) benefits
equally from her driving a little more quickly: each arrives at his
destination a bit sooner. So if the traffic and other conditions permit
her to drive slightly more quickly, this provides roughly proportional
benefits to one, ten, or forty passengers. In terms of the BPL
formula, a slightly higher speed imposes a slightly greater risk of
harm on each passenger, but also is likely to provide a slight benefit
to each passenger; the loss of that benefit is a marginal "burden" (B)
that might exceed the marginal increase in risk to their safety (P x L).
Compare a different bus driver case:
MARLA, DRIVING A BUS NEAR MANY OR FEW
PEDESTRIANS (PARADE ROUTE)
Marla is driving a bus. A parade has just ended and there
are thick crowds by the side of the road. Should she drive
more slowly in this scenario, than if the parade ended an
hour ago and there are only a few people still lingering?
financial burden of examining each check's signature was not warranted by the
reduction of risk of forgeries, under the Hand Formula. But note that the choice of an
economic metric here was appropriate because of the nature of the interests at stake.
And the aggregative method was appropriate because the bank customers-like the
plaintiff in the case-would bear much of the increased cost of forgery-detection.
There was thus little tension between the interests of the defendant and of the plaintiff.
Benjamin Zipursky, Sleight of Hand, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1999, 2025-26 (2007) (citations
omitted). For an analogous example, see Keating, supra note 2, at 712 (noting that the benefits
and burdens of the Pasteur vaccine are borne by the same class of people).
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Clearly she should drive more slowly when more people are at risk.
If she were to lose control of the bus just after the parade ended, the
bus would harm or kill many, rather than few.'
What explains the difference between this bus case and the
earlier one involving Louise and a variable number of bus
passengers? Why do numbers count for Marla, but not for Louise?
In both cases, after all, driving more slowly would decrease risks of
harm; and in both cases, driving more slowly when more people are
at risk (when the bus is more full, or the sidewalk is more crowded)
will reduce aggregate risk more. But by the same token, in both
cases each individual can plausibly claim that he is entitled to
adequate protection against risks of harm without regard to how
many other individuals are also at risk.
Perhaps the explanation is this. The pedestrians in "Parade
route" (unlike the riders on Louise's bus) clearly obtain no
compensating benefit from any decision by Marla to increase her
speed, and lose no benefit if she decreases her speed. So if she slows
down when the aggregate risk of harm is greater, they clearly are
better off.
Notice, though, that at any given speed, the individual risk that
the bus poses to each pedestrian could be precisely the same in both
scenarios (crowded sidewalk v. almost empty sidewalk), yet we
would still want her to slow down when the sidewalk is more
crowded. (Suppose there is a 1 in 1,000 risk of injury to each
pedestrian in each scenario if she is driving at thirty mph, a 1 in
2,000 risk if she is driving at twenty-five mph, and so on.) Thus, the
Louise example does not demonstrate that the individual risk to each
victim is always a determinative factor. Aggregate risk sometimes is
morally relevant even when individual risk does not vary (as it does
not in the Marla examples).92
Nevertheless, the intrapersonal aggregation approach is no
panacea. Trouble comes in the very common situation when the
class benefited and the class endangered are not perfectly
coextensive. Very often, an actor's risky conduct endangers many
people, and very often, these potential victims differ significantly in
91. Assume that the distance from the bus to the pedestrians, and all other variables affecting
the risk (such as the ability of the pedestrians to protect themselves), are precisely the same in
both cases. Thus, the only relevant difference is the number of endangered victims.
92. For more discussion of individual v. population risk, see infra text at notes 112-116.
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how much they benefit from the activity. (Even in the Louise
example, some passengers will benefit more than others from more
speedily reaching their destination, and some might not benefit at
all.) How much slippage, if any, is too much?
Recall the earlier example of speeding emergency vehicles
(police, ambulances, or fire engines) that endanger motorists and
pedestrians for a public purpose. Here, because everyone potentially
benefits from the availability of life-saving ambulances and fire
engines, or police vehicles that protect public security, it seems
plausible to conclude that those put at risk also obtain ex ante
benefits that suffice to justify the risk. (The vehicles should, of
course, proceed as safely as is realistically possible, consistent with
their need for speed.)
And yet, on closer inspection, this argument of potential benefit
is inconclusive. Relatively few people will actually need to be
rescued or protected by emergency vehicles. So we are really
comparing possible benefits with possible risks; and of course the
distribution of actual benefit and actual harm will (ex post) not be to
the net benefit of every person (especially those killed or seriously
injured by the speeding emergency vehicles).
Still, it might be enough that people value the chance of a
benefit sufficiently highly that it outweighs the risk of harm.
Obviously it can be justifiable to market a drug that will definitely
benefit me, but has a small chance of causing serious side-effects,
which (if they were to occur) would outweigh that benefit. But it
also seems quite justifiable to market a drug that will offer users only
a possible benefit, if that benefit is sufficiently great to justify the
risks.93
If all this is true, however, then the "potential benefit" argument
seems to have a much broader and more worrisome implication.
Think about the "unilateral risk-imposition" cases that deontologists
find especially troubling-"unilateral" in the sense that one party
obtains all or almost all of the benefit from the interaction. The
argument implies that such risks may very often be imposed-
specifically, whenever people have a sufficient ex ante chance to
93. Notice that in Zipursky's bank example, although the correlation of risk and benefit
intuitively seems sufficient to make the bank's level of precaution permissible, some bank
customers will actually be worse off under the bank's system than they would have been if the
bank had taken the suggested precaution.
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benefit either from that unilateral risk-imposition or from some other
unilateral risk-imposition. Let me explain.
Consider some relatively clear cases of unilateral risk
imposition: drivers create risks to pedestrians; product manufacturers
create risks to non-users of their products (for example, a bystander
is injured when a product explodes, crashes, or otherwise causes
harm);94 the activity of a sports team or facility results in balls being
hit out of the field or park into the surrounding community.95 In
these cases, where the potential victims do not benefit from the risky
activity, many nonconsequentialists would object that a simple
benefit/risk or cost/benefit analysis is inadequate to justify the risk,
insofar as one party benefits at the other party's expense. They
would insist, for example, that in building a fence to protect people
outside the park from harm, greater care is required than in building
a fence to protect spectators inside the park who benefit from the
activity.96
Yet it is possible to invoke the "potential benefit" argument even
here. Life is full of risky activities that benefit one party to the
interaction a little more (sometimes a lot more) than they benefit the
other. However, we all engage in multiple activities. Sometimes we
will be more at risk, sometimes less so. Sometimes we benefit more,
sometimes less. Sometimes we will be the unilateral imposers,
sometimes the imposees. It all comes out in the wash.
This argument, if persuasive, appears to justify a straightforward
utilitarian analysis of negligence, even in unilateral risk cases. The
94. In each case, the risk imposition is not entirely unilateral: pedestrians make decisions
about how closely to approach traffic, and bystanders injured by products might similarly make
decisions that affect their probability of injury. But the driver or product manufacturer (and
product user) obtain almost all of the benefit from the risky interaction, so it is appropriate to
characterize the benefits derived in the cases as substantially unilateral.
95. The classic illustration here is the English cricket case, Bolton v. Stone, [1951] A.C. 850
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.), in which a cricket ball was hit over the fence and struck
the plaintiff. Litigation over stray golf balls is also plentiful. See, e.g., Rinaldo v. McGovern,
587 N.E.2d 264 (N.Y. 1991) (in which a sliced golf ball "soared" off the course and shattered
plaintiff's windshield as she was driving by).
96. "Greater care" here could mean placing a thumb on the cost-benefit or BPL scale. See
infra text at notes 104-105. The important point is that, everything else being equal,
nonbeneficiaries of the activity are entitled to greater protection from risks of harm than are
beneficiaries. Everything else will often not be equal, of course. Most obviously, if the potential
victim is a spectator, he will likely have a much greater ability to protect himself from harm than
if he is a pedestrian strolling outside the park. Imagine, however, that the potential victim is a
five year old child, with little ability to protect himself in either case; here, greater care might still
be owed to the child walking outside the stadium than to the child sitting in the stands.
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constraint that intrapersonal aggregation was supposed to place upon
interpersonal aggregation has evaporated. Where did we go wrong?
We went awry in permitting much too broad a conception of
"potential benefit" in this last argument. That wide conception
essentially says: "You live in a society in which utilitarian
risk/benefit analysis governs all interactions. By permitting risk
imposition whenever the expected total benefits from the risk exceed
the expected total costs, we offer you the greatest ex ante chance of
utility, greater than the expected utility that any other criterion of
negligence would create." This broad understanding of "potential
benefit" goes too far: it potentially justifies very significant
distributional variations in many specific interactions. Even the
World Cup examples might, on this view, be cases where the victims
obtained a "potential benefit" and thus might be cases of permissible
risk-imposition.
So "potential benefit" must be understood more restrictively.
Just how we should draw the line between permissible and
impermissible inequalities in benefit and risk distribution, however,
is a daunting question. Is it a serious injustice that some bystanders
who do not benefit from using a particular type of consumer product
suffer injury from it? Presumably they use other consumer products;
is that similar enough to count as benefiting from "the activity"?
Neighbors of golf courses (who, let us assume, purchased their land
before the golf course was built) benefit if the presence of the golf
course increases the value of their homes. These complexities exist
in virtually every context.
Others who have explored these questions endorse some degree
of generalization of the nature of the risky activity, for the purpose of
determining who benefits from "that type" of risky activity, or of
determining how burdensome it would be to forbid "that type" of
risk.97 I offer no solution here,9" but simply point out the need to
define any category of "unilateral benefit from risk-imposition" with
care, and, perhaps, narrowly.
97. See Keating, supra note 2, at 704-718; see also Oberdiek, supra note 5, at 202-03;
Oberdiek, supra note 89, at 117-24; Perry, supra note 40, at 110-15; SCANLON, supra note 5, at
239-41 (discussing the possibility that aggregation is permitted for "relevant" but not "irrelevant"
risks while acknowledging the difficulty of drawing the distinction).
98. "Explaining the role and limits of aggregation is a difficult problem for moral theory
generally, not just for contractualism." Scanlon, supra note 78, at 354.
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2. Apply threshold deontology to risky activity
One way to make deontology more "hard-nosed" and more
accommodating of tradeoffs is to permit consequences to count, or
even to dominate, after (but only after) the consequences have
surpassed some threshold of seriousness. Even the relatively
absolutist libertarian approach of Robert Nozick, for example, has a
"catastrophe" exception.99 Other threshold deontologists place the
threshold much lower. In the context of judging when it is
impermissible to create a risk of harm, the threshold must be much
lower than "catastrophe" if this approach is meant to justify our
actual social practice of accepting a broad range of risky activities.
Some believe that threshold deontology is incoherent.' Others
find this form of moderate deontology perfectly defensible.' ' Rather
than engage this difficult, more general debate, I will try to identify
versions of threshold deontology in the context of negligence that are
intuitively attractive.
These versions are not as simple as usual threshold deontology
principles of the form, "Don't violate a right or duty (e.g., don't
suppress speech, don't torture, don't punish or kill an innocent
person) unless the consequences of respecting the right or duty are
unusually bad." Rather, some of them might be interpreted instead
as instances of "threshold consequentialism"-an acceptance of
consequentialism but only up to a point or subject to certain limits.
For many of them require significant variations on a straightforward
consequentialist calculus of the basic form, "take a precaution if B <
P x L."
In very general terms, at least three techniques are available to a
deontologist who wishes to consider consequences without fully
99. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 29-30 n. * (1974); see also JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 356 (1993) (stating that the state may restrict a basic liberty such
as speech, but only in order to prevent a greater loss to basic liberties).
100. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Deontology at the Threshold, 37 SAN DIEGO L. R. 893, 856,
905-10 (2000); Alexander & Moore, supra note 42, § 4; see also Matthew D. Adler, Why De
Minimis? (June 8, 2007) (unpublished research paper No. 0712, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=992878).
101. See SHELLY KAGAN, NORMATIVE ETHICS 78-84 (1998) (arguing that moderate
deontology is "a genuine alternative to consequentialism"); cf KAMM, supra note 53, at 285-301
(although not admitting to be a threshold deontologist, Kamm permits aggregation and gives
weight to the relative numbers of victims and the relative size of burdens; indeed, she does so
surprisingly often, for a deontologist).
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endorsing a consequentialist analysis of permissible risk. However,
a fuller exploration of these methods must await another day.
First, the deontologist can ignore trivial benefits.' 2 This is one
possible explanation of the World Cup examples: the aggregate
benefits to even a billion people are morally and legally irrelevant if
the benefit to each person is tiny. This approach also helps explain
why highly refined marginal analysis sometimes seems
objectionable. °3
Second, she can place a thumb on the usual scale, either in all
cases or in a subcategory of cases, such as clear instances of
unilateral risk imposition. This is the "disproportionate risk"
approach that, some believe, the English courts followed until
recently. 4 Instead of finding D negligent if B < P x L, a "thumb" is
added to the scale as follows:
D is negligent if and only if B < n x ( P x L), where n > 1.1
102. See KAMM, supra note 53, at 34 (discussing the Principle of Irrelevant Goods). Consider
Kamm's "Sore Throat" case. If we are choosing between preventing a serious harm to A or an
equally serious harm to B, she says that we should flip a coin. What if B also has a Sore Throat?
That is insufficient reason in this context, she says, to save B; we should still flip a coin. Id.; see
also T.M. Scanlon, Replies, 17 RATIO 424, 433 (2003) (tentatively endorsing Parfit's suggested
Triviality Principle).
103. Recall the earlier image of a corporate accountant methodically inputting the various
probabilities of harm and benefit into a spreadsheet; if the costs are $1,000,001 and the benefits
are $1,000,000, then under a marginal cost-benefit analysis, he should instruct the engineers or
product designers not to add the safety feature. But under Kamm's "Irrelevant Utilities"
argument, presumably it would be better if he flipped a coin.
On the other hand, the situation of evaluating permissible levels of risk is a highly
repetitive one, and will often result in relatively close calls, given how often we need to make
decisions about the level of precaution. So perhaps it is more defensible to reject Kamm's
approach here and adopt a consistent strategy of choosing the less costly option, at least if the
costs have been properly valued in the first place. In the original "Sore Throat" case, by contrast,
the situation appears to be extraordinary and highly unlikely to repeat.
104. Stephen G. Gilles, The Emergence of Cost-Benefit Balancing in English Negligence
Law, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 489, 497 (2002). Mark Geistfeld has endorsed a version of this
approach. See Geistfeld, supra note 80, at 610; Geistfeld, Reconciling Cost-Benefit Analysis with
the Principle that Safety Matters More than Money, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 114, 166 (2001); see also
Keating, supra note 78, at 160 (endorsing, in special situations, statutory standards that require
risk reduction (1) to greatest extent feasible or (2) until activity is safe). Philosopher Derek Parfit,
in an effort to make sense of Scanlon's argument against aggregation, discusses the
"Disproportional View": "Lesser burdens should be discounted, since their moral importance is
less than proportional to their size." Derek Parfit, Justifiability to Each Person, 16 RATIO 368,
379 (2003). Parfit ultimately rejects this view, and concludes, more generally, that Scanlon
"rejects utilitarianism for the wrong reason. Utilitarians go astray, not by letting the numbers
count, but by ignoring or rejecting all principles of distributive justice." Id. at 379-80.
105. For example, suppose n=2:
D is negligent if and only ifB < 2 x ( P x L)
Compare this with the ordinary BPL test:
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Third, she can adopt a hierarchy of interests, prioritizing the
protection of some interests over the protection of others. This
approach might express deontological principles even if the interests
that are balanced are the Learned Hand factors B, P, and L. Thus,
with respect to "L," arguably, property matters less than physical
integrity, and economic interests matter the least."0 6 With respect to
"B," we might value loss of important social benefits more highly
than loss of private benefits or more than financial costs.0 7 Insofar
as we employ deontological criteria to prioritize interests within
BPL, we depart from a simple utilitarian calculus. On the other
hand, prioritization can also express a pluralist, idealized conception
of "utility."
Each of these possible solutions creates its own set of problems,
however. "Ignoring trivial benefits" requires us to define the
threshold of triviality; presumably we need to relate triviality to some
defensible baseline level of risk.0 8 The "thumb on the scale"
prompts several questions: How heavy a "thumb"? Why that precise
weight? For what categories of cases? Instead of this approach,
perhaps we would do better to start with a more justifiable set of
social values that we should then directly balance, without any
"thumb." 0 9
B PL B<PL B<2PL
Ordinary test Thumb
49 50 Negl Negl
60 50 Notnegi Negl
80 50 Not negl Negl
100 50 Not negl Not negi
The tests give different results in the two shaded rows. For a similar analysis, see Geistfeld,
supra note 104, at 147-49 (concluding that the "thumb," n, should be precisely 2).
106. Of course, tort doctrine itself relegates economic and emotional interests to a lesser
status, insofar as negligently inflicting these types of harms is not independently actionable
(although they are sometimes recoverable if incident to physical harms).
107. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f (1998) (declaring that
whether liability would have a "negative effect on corporate earnings" or merely "would reduce
employment in a given industry" should not be considered in the risk/utility calculus for design
defect).
108. See, e.g., Keating, supra note 78, at 194-95. For the argument that this type of
"triviality" or "irrelevant utilities" argument ultimately collapses, see Norcross, supra note 3;
Parfit, supra note 104.
109. See Simons, supra note 19, at 78-81.
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With respect to hierarchies of interests, tort law does, and
arguably should, remedy deprivations even of less important
interests, including economic harms, especially when they follow
from physical harms to person or property. Moreover, to say that "in
general" interest X is more important than interest Y is problematic.
Even if this is often true, a much greater infringement on Y (the less
weighty interest) can be more significant, morally and legally, than a
much lesser infringement on X (the more weighty interest)."'
Losing a life due to another's tort is indeed worse than losing a
finger, which is worse than losing a day's wages. But the loss of a
day, or an hour, of one's life need not be valued more than the
physical destruction of a factory. And once we consider the very
realistic possibility of precautions that avoid a tiny risk of infringing
(more weighty) interest X in order to preserve a higher probability of
not infringing or of furthering (less weighty) interest Y, this
approach becomes even less plausible."' Unless one endorses the
extreme (and implausible) position that preventing any infringements
of X should have absolute lexical priority over preventing any
infringements of Y, these difficult questions of comparative value
will persist.
Finally, a critical question for any of these possible solutions is
the question of when they should apply. Are they understood to be a
pervasive criterion of negligence, applicable in all contexts? Or are
they to be employed only in a subset of cases? One plausible view is
as follows: We should first identify the cases in which the
presumptive negligence criterion should apply. Either a qualified
deontological or a qualified consequentialist criterion might be
employed here. This presumptive criterion might, for example,
apply to all interactions in which there is either strict or approximate
reciprocity of benefit and burden. But we would then identify cases
in which a more stringent criterion should apply--cases, for
example, in which one party clearly obtains a unilateral benefit from
the interaction.
110. See Perry, supra note 35, at 41; Simons, supra note 19, at 81-82.
111. Suppose the only medicine that will relieve a headache has a very tiny risk of causing
personal injury or death. Or consider carbonated beverages, which serve the drinker's modest
interest in quenching his thirst while enjoying the pleasurable sensation of carbonation, but at the
risk of a tiny, realistically unavoidable risk of death from the bottle exploding.
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Recall the question of whether the owners of an athletic field
must use greater care in building a fence to protect people outside the
park from harm, than in building a fence to protect spectators inside
the park who benefit from the activity. On the view just suggested, a
qualified consequentialist or qualified deontological criterion is
appropriate for determining the requisite degree of safety for those
inside the park, while a "thumb on the scale" test (or some other
more stringent variant) is appropriate for determining the requisite
degree of safety that we should guarantee to those outside the park
who do not obtain any significant benefit from the activity.
3. Consider individual risk but not population risk
A third possible deontological answer to the problem of
permissible tradeoffs is to allow tradeoffs, but only if the required
precaution lowers the individual risk to those endangered. On this
approach, it is not sufficient that the precaution will lower the
aggregate population risk. As we will see, this approach is
promising but seems to have only limited practical relevance in tort
law.
One important difference between some rights-based and
contractualist approaches to risk, on the one hand, and a
consequentialist approach, on the other, is the way in which
regulatory policy addresses individual rather than population risk.
Suppose an agency has sufficient funds to do only one of the
following:.. 2
(1) Eliminate toxic chemicals that are present in high
concentrations in Smallville and that create an incremental
fatality risk of 1 in 1,000 for each of the small town's 1,000
residents; or
(2) Eliminate toxic chemicals that are present in much
lower concentrations in Big City's waste dump and that
create an incremental fatality risk of 2 in 100,000 for each
of the city's 100,000 residents.
"In this sort of case, it is standardly suggested, 'population risk'
considerations weigh in favor of cleaning up the [Big City] dump,
while individual risk considerations weigh in favor of cleaning up the
112. The example is from Matthew Adler & Chris Sanchirico, Inequality and Uncertainty:
Theory and LegalApplications, 155 U. PA. L. REv. 279, 355-56 (2006).
1218
Summer 2008] NEGLIGENCE COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS
[Smallville] town dump.""'3 If we clean up Big City, we can expect
to save more lives in the total population (two rather than one). By
contrast, if instead we clean up Smallville, we protect those who are
at much higher individual risk (1 in 1,000 rather than 1 in 50,000).
Regulators might take one or the other, or both, of these types of risk
into account (depending on the particular statutory mandate).
Consequentialists tend to favor the population risk approach.
What ultimately matters, they believe, is the bottom-line "body
count," the total number of injuries or deaths that could be prevented.
Nonconsequentialists might also (or instead) value individual risk. 4
This debate has some relevance for tort law, and for the
articulation of standards of permissible risk-imposition. A
consequentialist will again support the population risk approach,
while a contractualist is more likely to support some version of the
individual risk approach.
For example, suppose I am driving an ambulance and must get
to the hospital promptly in order to save my passenger's life. I must
take either Road A or Road B. I happen to know (this is an academic
paper, after all) the following:
ROAD A OR ROAD B?
Road A: Four pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each has
a 10 percent chance of dying if I speed by them fast enough
to save the person in the back of the ambulance.
Road B: Twenty pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each
has a 3 percent chance of dying if I speed by them.
The expected death toll on Road A is 0.4; on Road B, it is 0.6.
What should I do?
If population risk controls, I should take Road A; for Road B
can be expected (over enough similar cases) to result in a 50 percent
higher death rate. If individual risk controls, I should take Road B,
since it is morally more problematic to impose a 10 percent risk of
death on a population than to impose a 3 percent risk on a
113. Id.; see also Adam M. Finkel, Comparing Risks Thoughtfully, 7 RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY
& ENV'T 325 (1996).
114. But cf Matthew D. Adler, Against 'Individual Risk': A Sympathetic Critique of Risk
Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121, 1246-47 (2005) (arguing that even a deontological
perspective cannot justify the individual risk approach).
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population. Because contractualists focus on the burden for each
individual, they are likely to support the individual risk approach.1 '5
This example might not be terribly compelling: If it is purely a
matter of chance whether a pedestrian happens to be on Road A or
Road B, and if the risk of harm is relatively low in either case, would
he really care whether the ex ante risk happens to be much higher in
one location? Is the slight difference in risk really enough to trouble
him? But imagine this variation, where I must take either Road C or
Road D:
ROAD C OR ROAD D?
Road C: Two pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each has
a 50 percent chance of dying if I speed by them fast enough
to save two people in the back of the ambulance.
Road D: Twelve pedestrians are on the sidewalk, and each
has a 10 percent chance of dying if I speed by them (again,
in order to save two people).
The expected death toll on Road C is 1.0; on Road D, it is 1.2.
What should I do?
Here, the intuition seems especially strong that taking Road D is
preferable to taking Road C, and this seems to support the individual
risk approach. Indeed, not only is Road C the less acceptable of the
two road options, it might well be an impermissible option even if
the other route, Road D, did not exist. Taking Road C might be
impermissible because creating such a high, concentrated risk to the
two pedestrians might not justify the benefit of saving the life of the
two ambulance passengers.116
These examples suggest that at least when the individual risk is
especially high, respect for the individual (on a contractualist or
other nonconsequentialist account) might permit, or even require, a
115. However, if a contractualist considers only the ex post burden each individual suffers as
morally relevant, not the ex ante chance of being burdened, she will reject this analysis.
116. If the reader does not share the view that taking Road C is impermissible even if there is
no alternative Road D, he will likely consider it impermissible for the ambulance to take Road C*
(a more extreme version of Road C), even if there is no alternative road:
Road C*: Two pedestrians are on the sidewalk, each of whom has a 90 percent chance
of dying if the ambulance speeds by.
For further discussion, see Simons, supra note 19, at 65.
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choice to minimize individual risk even at the expense of increasing
population risk, i.e., even at the expense of increasing aggregate
expected bad consequences.
But how often do these considerations make a difference in
negligence law? Not often, I suspect. Given the more typical, low-
level risks characteristic of most tort negligence cases, it is often
plausible to assume that, for each individual, the aggregate benefits
she obtains from all activities that expose her to approximately that
level of risk exceed the aggregate risks. If intrapersonal aggregation
of this sort is a justifiable basis for permitting risky activity, then it
will justify most low-level risks, whether understood as individual or
population risk. The choice between the risk approaches is unlikely
to matter when the risks are extremely small, as in the Smallville v.
Big City contrast. The benefits to the people at risk are unlikely to
vary enough to make the differential in risks decisive. But when the
difference in individual risks between the two endangered groups is
great and the risks themselves are quite substantial (for example, at
least 5 percent), then a differential in benefits between the groups
might indeed make a difference to permissibility.
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me say a few words about the Learned Hand
test, then about the choice between qualified consequentialist and
qualified deontological accounts of negligence.
A. Liberating the Learned Hand Test
Advocates of efficiency analysis have hijacked the Learned
Hand test, treating it as a self-evident formula for aggregating costs
and benefits, often presuming a market valuation of the relevant
interests, and typically ignoring distribution. The Hand formula can
be rescued from this sordid fate.
How can it be rescued? I have explored the question more fully
elsewhere," 7 so the answer here is brief. To a significant extent, the
formula can accommodate both sensitive consequentialist and tough-
minded deontological accounts of negligence, each of which is much
more plausible than unqualified consequentialist or unqualified
deontological accounts. The formula is sufficiently general to
117. See Simons, Hand Formula, supra note 25.
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accommodate these different justifications for tort negligence
liability.
However, a more careful articulation of the formula should
emphasize the social value of the relevant interests. To be
defensible, the utilitarian account should be idealized, and to a
greater extent than the current Restatement (Third) draft provides."8
Moreover, in cases of advertent negligence, the Hand formula
factors should be part of a jury instruction, in order to discipline and
guide decision-making more effectively than the widely used,
extremely vague "reasonable care under the circumstances" standard.
In the context of corporate liability for negligence, it might be
appropriate to require even more specific criteria, as the Restatement
(Third) and many jurisdictions now do when defining products
liability design and warning defects.
At the same time, an abstract BPL test is often highly
misleading. Where possible, more context-specific standards should
be articulated, specifying the scope of the duty and the criteria for
breach of duty. Moreover, the distribution of risks and benefit is
absolutely essential to understanding the permissibility of risky
activity. In suitable cases, the jury instruction should also require
explicit consideration of who benefits from the activity, and who is
most exposed to its risks.
Once we develop a defensible formula or criterion for when
tradeoff is permissible, then we should not only allow tradeoffs, but,
in a significant range of cases, encourage actors to make the tradeoffs
explicitly. To this extent, Viscusi's complaint, noted in the
introduction, is correct: if an explicit tradeoff of values is what the
most defensible moral and legal theory requires, then it is often
sensible to require the actor to make that tradeoff explicitly. (The
notorious Ford Pinto case is not a persuasive counterexample, for it
does not prove the moral unacceptability of all forms of analysis that
118. See id. at 925, 936-39. Notice that L (the harm to the victim, if the precaution is not
taken) is especially difficult to value when it refers to loss of life. However, given the
impressionable and imprecise nature of any actual balancing test in the tort context, this is not too
problematic. Still, it might be appropriate for government to approve a presumptive value of life
for regulatory purposes, and to employ that value in the tort context as well. (The value should be
subject to modification in light of qualitative aspects of the risk.)
Of course, this value would be employed ex ante, in judging whether the precaution
should have been taken. It is a separate question how the law should compensate for loss of life
ex post.
1222
Summer 2008]NEGLIGENCE COST-BENEFIT ANAL YSIS
trade off the advantages and the disadvantages of taking a
precaution. Instead, it reveals the problems with an unduly low
valuation of human life." 9)
If the explicit decision to proceed with a risky activity or to omit
a precaution is made properly, with a socially acceptable balancing
of the relevant factors, then the activity or omission is permissible.
The fact that a conscious tradeoff decision was made does not
amount to fault. Even if the explicit decision to proceed with the
activity or to omit a precaution is made improperly, for example by
giving undue (excessive or insufficient) weight to certain factors or
by not exploring alternatives carefully enough, the additional fact
that the risk was created advertently rather than inadvertently does
not necessarily mean that the actor is more at fault.
B. Choosing Between Qualified Consequentialist and
Qualified Deontological Accounts of Negligence
I have argued that we should reject unqualified consequentialist
or deontological accounts of negligence, and should endorse
qualified versions instead. But what difference does it make whether
we incorporate qualifications within a consequentialist or a
deontological approach?
Even if we idealize or qualify a value (such as B, P, or L) in the
consequentialist analysis, the analysis still commits us to maximizing
aggregate "amounts" of the value. Some would still find that
objectionable. On the other hand, incorporating a distributive
constraint within the consequentialist criterion partially addresses
this concern. However, if we adopt this solution, we might find it
difficult to create a simple verbal formulation for the distribution-
sensitive criterion.
At the same time, even a qualified deontological account might
be unable to justify at least some risky activities that intuitively
appear to be perfectly acceptable. For example, if the deontological
119. The 1972 government study upon which the cost-benefit analysis was based assigned
only $200,000 to the loss of a life, a low figure even adjusting for inflation since 1972. See
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 1022. Moreover, there is some question whether the cost of a
precaution was also overstated, since the precaution that was quantified in the cost-benefit
analysis, a post-sale installation of a shield, almost certainly would produce much higher
aggregate costs over the entire fleet of Pintos than would the pre-sale precaution of properly
investigating the proposed fuel tank placement in the first place and then developing and
producing a safer initial design.
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account permits only a narrow type of intrapersonal aggregation
(permitting an act or activity to endanger someone only if his
expected benefits from each act or activity, considered separately,
exceed the ex ante risks), there remain activities in which at least
some of the people exposed to the risk do not obtain a net benefit,
even ex ante. If we believe (as most of us do) that such activities can
still be permissible, so long as the proportion of individuals who
"lose out" on balance from the activity is sufficiently small, then we
seem to be committed, to that extent, to a consequentialist
justification.
In the end, perhaps our considered intuitions about which
instances of risk creation and risk imposition are permissible and
which are impermissible, commit us to some sort of mixture or
mutual accommodation of deontological and consequentialist
principles. Is such an accommodation theoretically incoherent? If
so, then perhaps we should revise some of our intuitions, or even
abandon our commitment to coherence. Better still, we should work
even harder on developing a subtle, coherent, principled, and
persuasive answer to this extraordinarily challenging question: when
is it permissible to create a risk of harm to others?
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